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What Determines Corruption? International Evidence from Micro Data

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Naci Mocan

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Abstract

This paper utilizes a micro-level data set from 49 countries to address three issues: What determines corruption at the individual level? What determines the perception of the extent of corruption in the country? Does corruption have a direct impact on growth when the quality of the institutions are controlled for? In addition, the paper creates a direct measure of corruption which portrays the extent of corruption as revealed byindividuals who live in those countries. The results show that both personal and country characteristics determine the risk of exposure to bribery. Examples are gender, wealth, education, marital status, the city size, the legal origin of the country, the existence of uninterrupted democracy, a war between 1960s and 1980s, and the strength of the institutions in the country (measured by the risk of expropriation). The second part of the paper shows that controlling for endogeneity of corruption and institutional quality, actual corruption in the country and the proportion of the bribes asked by various government agencies have no direct impact on corruption perception. On the other hand, an improvement in the quality of institutions lowers the perception of corruption. The final section of the paper shows that controlling for the quality of the institutions, corruption does not have a direct impact on growth. Keeping constant the geographical location of the country, the legal origin, religious composition, the presence of a war, the federal status, initial education and income as well as the extent of corruption in the country, a one-half standard deviation increase in the quality of institutions (e.g. from the level of Indonesia to the level of India), generates an additional 0.7 percentage point increase in the average annual per capita GDP growth.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10460.

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Date of creation: May 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10460

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H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Graeff, P. & Mehlkop, G., 2003. "The impact of economic freedom on corruption: different patterns for rich and poor countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 605-620, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, 1999. "Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?," NBER Working Papers 7093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. James Andreoni & Lise Vesterlund, 2001. "Which Is The Fair Sex? Gender Differences In Altruism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 293-312, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, 2003. "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002," Macroeconomics 0308006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 1999. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," NBER Working Papers 7108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A & Thaicharoen, Yunyong, 2002. "Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3575, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. repec:rus:hseeco:72137 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. H. Naci Mocan & Daniel I. Rees, 1999. "Economic Conditions, Deterrence and Juvenile Crime: Evidence from Micro Data," NBER Working Papers 7405, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes And How Much? Evidence From A Cross Section Of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "The Quality of Government," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1847, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  17. Swamy, Anand & Knack, Stephen & Lee, Young & Azfar, Omar, 2001. "Gender and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 25-55, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Dollar, David & Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2001. "Are women really the "fairer" sex? Corruption and women in government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 423-429, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Barro, Robert J & Lee, Jong Wha, 1996. "International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 218-23, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hunt, Jennifer, 2004. "Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime," IZA Discussion Papers 1179, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Raghbendra Jha & T. Palanivel, 2007. "Resource Augmentation for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals in the Asia Pacific Region," Departmental Working Papers 2007-02, Australian National University, Economics RSPAS. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Rui Baptista, 2004. "Culture, Institutions and Government Attitudes towards New Firm Entry," Papers on Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy 2004-39, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Entrepreneurship, Growth and Public Policy Group. [Downloadable!]
  4. Finan, Frederico & Ferraz, Claudio, 2005. "Reelection Incentives and Political Corruption: Evidence from Brazilian Audit Reports," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19544, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  5. Axel Dreher & Friedrich Schneider, 2006. "Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, 2005. "Attitudes Towards Paying Taxes in Austria: An Empirical Analysis," Empirica, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 231-250, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Benno Torgler & Neven T. Valev, 2007. "Public Attitudes Toward Corruption and Tax Evasion: Investigating the Role of Gender Over Time," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 214, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology. [Downloadable!]
  8. Benjamin A. Olken, 2006. "Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality," NBER Working Papers 12428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. J. Vernon Henderson & Ari Kuncoro, 2006. "Sick of Local Government Corruption? Vote Islamic," NBER Working Papers 12110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Yanjing Chen & Mahmut YaÅŸar & Roderick Rejesus, 2008. "Factors Influencing the Incidence of Bribery Payouts by Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 231-244, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Jennifer Hunt, 2005. "Why Are Some Public Officials more Corrupt Than Others?," NBER Working Papers 11595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Michael T. Rock, 2007. "Corruption and Democracy," Working Papers 55, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs. [Downloadable!]
  13. Philip Shaw & Marina-Selini Katsaiti & Marius Jurgilas, 2006. "Corruption and Growth Under Weak Identification," Working papers 2006-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2007. [Downloadable!]
  14. Naci H. Mocan, 2008. "Vengeance," NBER Working Papers 14131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Olken, Benjamin, 2007. "Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality," CEPR Discussion Papers 6272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Benno Torgler & Neven T. Valev, 2006. "Women and Illegal Activities: Gender Differences and Women’s Willingness to Comply over Time," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-15, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
  17. James Roumasset, 2008. "The Political Economy of Corruption: A Philippine Illustrationa," Working Papers 200805, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Bin Dong & Uwe Dulleck & Benno Torgler, 2009. "Conditional Corruption," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 241, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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