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Population and Regulation

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Author Info
Casey B. Mulligan
Andrei Shleifer

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Abstract

We present a model of efficient regulation along the lines of Demsetz (1967). In this model, setting up and running regulatory institutions takes a fixed cost, and therefore jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have them. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U.S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history. We also find that specific types of regulation, including the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations. Overall, the data show that population is an empirically important determinant of regulation.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10234.

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Date of creation: Jan 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10234

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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  1. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Juan Botero, 2003. "The Regulation of Labor," NBER Working Papers 9756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Becker, Gary S & Mulligan, Casey B, 2003. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 293-340, October.
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  3. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ross, Thomas W, 1994. "Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 109-31, April.
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  5. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "What Works in Securities Law?," NBER Working Papers 9882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Xavier Gabaix, 1999. "Zipf'S Law For Cities: An Explanation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 739-767, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. William M. Landes, 1968. "The Economics of Fair Employment Laws," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 507. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Edward Glaeser & Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Coase Versus The Coasians," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 853-899, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-57, January.
  15. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "A Reason for Quantity Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 431-435, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Goldin, Claudia, 1988. "Maximum Hours Legislation and Female Employment: A Reassessment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 189-205, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation Of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1985. "Corporate Chartering: An Exploration in the Economics of Legal Change," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(4), pages 585-99, October.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. John W. Dawson & John J. Seater, 2005. "The Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Regulation," Working Papers 05-02, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martín, 2003. "Social Security, Retirement, and the Single-Mindedness of the Electorate," Economics Working Papers 686, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Casey Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Conscription as Regulation," NBER Working Papers 10558, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. John W. Dawson, 2005. "Regulation and the Macroeconomy," Working Papers 05-16, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Coviello, Decio & Islam, Roumeen, 2006. "Does aid help improve economic institutions ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3990, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Robert J. Barro & Rachel M. McCleary, 2004. "Which Countries Have State Religions?," NBER Working Papers 10438, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Ricard Gil, 2003. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," NBER Working Papers 10040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Mohammad Amin & Priya Ranjan, 2008. "When Does Legal Origin Matter?," Working Papers 080912, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Simeon Djankov & José Garcia Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2005. "The Curse of Aid," Economics Working Papers 870, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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