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A Comparison of NTU values on a Certain Class of Games

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  • Chaowen Yu

    (Graduate School of Economics, Keio University)

Abstract

The Maschler-Owen value and the NTU Shapley value are two well-known ex- tensions of the TU Shapley value. In this paper, we compare a set of axioms that these values satisfy on the domain of games consisting of all monotonic hyperplane games and all monotonic prize games (Hart [1994]). The axiomatization of these two values on this domain are also given.

Suggested Citation

  • Chaowen Yu, 2013. "A Comparison of NTU values on a Certain Class of Games," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2012-041, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.
    • Handle: RePEc:kei:dpaper:2012-041
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Sergiu, 1985. "An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1295-1313, November.
    2. Aumann, Robert J, 1985. "An Axiomatization of the Non-transferable Utility Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 599-612, May.
    3. Sergiu Hart, 2004. "A comparison of non-transferable utility values," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 35-46, April.
    4. Sergiu Hart, 2005. "An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 355-366, September.
    5. Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(4), pages 389-407.
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