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A Focal-Point Solution for Bargaining Problems with Coalition Structure

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Author Info
Gustavo Bergantiños (Universidade de Vigo)
Balbina Casas- Méndez (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela)
Gloria Fiestras- Janeiro (Universidade de Vigo)
Juan Vidal-Puga (Universidade de Vigo)

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Abstract

In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues (2004) and Vidal-Puga (2005a). Several axiomatic characterizations and two noncooperative mechanisms are proposed.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0511006.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 16 Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511006

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31
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Related research
Keywords: coalition structure bargaining values;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Krasa, Stefan & Temimi, Akram & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2003. "Coalition structure values in differential information economies: is unity a strength?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 51-62, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Winter, Eyal, 1991. "On Non-transferable Utility Games with Coalition Structure," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 53-63.
  3. Hart, Sergiu, 1985. "An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1295-1313, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Chae, Suchan & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "A group bargaining solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 37-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Chae, Suchan & Moulin, Herve, 2004. "Bargaining among Groups: An Axiomatic Viewpoint," Working Papers 2004-01, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "The Harsanyi paradox and the 'right to talk' in bargaining among coalitions," Game Theory and Information 0501005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Maschler, M & Owen, G, 1989. "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 389-407.
  8. Aumann, Robert J, 1985. "An Axiomatization of the Non-transferable Utility Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(3), pages 599-612, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Borm, Peter, et al, 1992. "The Compromise Value for NTU-Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 175-89.
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  10. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Geoffroy de Clippel & Hans Peters & Horst Zank, 2004. "Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 145-158, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 679-701, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Kalai, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 1985. "Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 307-27, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "The NTU consistent coalitional value," Game Theory and Information 0303007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2008. "The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure," MPRA Paper 8904, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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