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On National or Supranational Objectives: Improving the Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs

Author

Listed:
  • Mr. Ping Zhang
  • Mr. Eivind Tandberg
  • Mr. Ehtisham Ahmad

Abstract

Central governments or the international community at large are concerned about subnational service delivery. The design of targeted expenditure programs features frequently in central efforts to redistribute infrastructure and social spending or assure minimum standards. These programs are typically financed by the center, often with external assistance, but are implemented at the subnational level, which may not have incentives to spend the resources as intended by the center or donors. We discuss mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of targeted public expenditure programs, modeling the interaction between different levels of government as a dynamic game. An incentive structure could be designed that compelled local governments to truthfully reveal their ability to implement national programs in a cost-effective manner and to exert the effort required to maximize the expected benefits. The models have direct policy relevance in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), where donor-financed resources are used for poverty-reduction at the local level, or in large countries such as China, where there is an effort to redirect social and infrastructure spending to particular regions.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Ping Zhang & Mr. Eivind Tandberg & Mr. Ehtisham Ahmad, 2002. "On National or Supranational Objectives: Improving the Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs," IMF Working Papers 2002/209, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2002/209
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mr. Ehtisham Ahmad & Mr. Leonardo Martinez, 2004. "On the Design and Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs," IMF Working Papers 2004/220, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Ahmad, Ehtisham, 2009. "Fiscal policy instruments and the political economy of designing programs to reach the poorest," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 38344, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Mr. Luc E. Leruth & Elisabeth Paul, 2006. "A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries," IMF Working Papers 2006/204, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Ehtisham Ahmad & Leo Martinez, 2004. "On the Design and Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0418, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

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