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Corporate Governance and Ownership: Measurement and Impact on Corporate Performance and Dividend Policies in Argentina

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Author Info
Ricardo N. Bebczuk

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we assemble, for the first time, quantitative measures of the quality of the corporate governance and the ownership structure of 65 non-financial listed companies in Argentina with information for 2003-2004. A wide array of official and private sources was used for this purpose. In a nutshell, companies seem to be poorly governed vis-à-vis international practices. In turn, ownership appears to be quite concentrated at the level of the largest ultimate shareholder, but separation of control and cash flow rights prevails in less than half of the companies, with pyramiding being the main mechanism for creating such a wedge. Second, we test the predictions of recent theories linking those measures with corporate performance and dividend policy in 2000-2003. In regard to performance, the results point to a sizable and robust effect of our governance measure on both the return on assets and Tobin` q. Moreover, the separation of control and cash flow rights for the largest shareholder -an indicator of incentives to expropriate minority shareholders -hinders performance directly, and also attenuates the beneficial impact of good governance rules. When it comes to dividends, only our governance measure appears to exert a positive and marked effect on the cash dividend-to-cash flow ratio. However, the estimates prove to be fragile to the inclusion of some additional controls correlated to governance.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series RES Working Papers with number 3212.

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Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3212

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Joshua Angrist & Alan Krueger, 2001. "Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments," Working Papers 834, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. " Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-51, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. repec:fth:prinin:455 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance And Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 107-155, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Roque B. Fernández & Sergio Pernice & Jorge M. Streb, 2007. "Determinants of the development of corporate bond markets in Argentina: One size does not fit all," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 348, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Fernando Lefort, 2005. "Ownership Structure And Corporate Governance In Latin America," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 8(1), pages 55-84. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alberto Chong & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007. "Corporate Governance in Latin America," RES Working Papers 4494, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alberto Chong & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007. "Gobierno Corporativo en América Latina," RES Working Papers 4495, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Oskar Kowalewski & Ivan Stetsyuk & Oleksandr Talavera, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in Poland," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 702, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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