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Ein wertschöpfungsbasierter Ansatz der einzelwirtschaftlichen Verteilungstheorie. Bilanzpolitik und Arbeitsrecht als institutionalisierte Verhandlungsrestriktionen

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  • Florian Turk

    (Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the EC, University of Trier)

Abstract

Kollektive Aktivitäten werden organisiert und damit Kooperationsrenten ermöglicht, indem unter anderem Produktions- und Verteilungsprozesse institutionalisiert werden. Die Kooperationsrente im weitesten Sinne - und damit die gemeinsame Erfolgsgröße - ist die Wertschöpfung. Über formelle und informelle Regeln können institutionelle Restriktionen etabliert werden, die einen Verteilungsvorteil für spezifische Anspruchsgruppen garantieren. Als zentrale Frage ergibt sich, welche Verteilung der Wertschöpfung aus einem nicht-kooperativen Verteilungsprozess innerhalb des Zusammenwirkens ökonomischer und politischer Prozesse und der doppelten Vertragsunvollständigkeit resultiert. Hierbei wird die Beziehung zwischen Verteilungskonflikten und Institutionen in Form der systematischen Korrelation von Verteilungsasymmetrien mit institutionell bedingten Verhandlungsasymmetrien herausgearbeitet.

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Turk, 2001. "Ein wertschöpfungsbasierter Ansatz der einzelwirtschaftlichen Verteilungstheorie. Bilanzpolitik und Arbeitsrecht als institutionalisierte Verhandlungsrestriktionen," IAAEG Discussion Papers until 2011 200102, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    • Handle: RePEc:iaa:wpaper:200102
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wertschöpfungsverteilung; Stakeholder; Rubinstein-Spiel;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D - Microeconomics
    • D - Microeconomics

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