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A Game Theoretical Model of Land Contract Choice

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Author Info
Américo M. S. Carvalho Mendes () (Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto))

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Abstract

In most of the land tenancy literature the type of contract is exogenous. Also even though these contracts vary a lot among farms, between regions and over time, the theoretical literature has not always acknowledged this idiosyncrasy. Building on the strategic bargaining theory initiated by Rubinstein, this model not only makes the type of contract endogenous, but also provides the surplus sharing rules and the conditions giving rise to each type of contract, showing how the type and terms of the contract are tailored to fit the characteristics of the parties and their economic environment. Pairwise bargaining is embedded into a market context by putting “competitive pressure” on the players through the opportunity they have to break up bargaining and look for alternative partners. Because of this threat of opting out, the outcome of the bargaining process depends not only on the characteristics of the players, but also on events outside their match and the information they have about them. The model departs from price-taking assumptions. Type and terms of the contract result from negotiation and are shaped by the “relative bargaining powers” of the players whose relevant components are identified in a precise way in the model.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto) in its series Documentos de Trabalho em Economia (Working Papers in Economics) with number 01.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cap:wpaper:012007

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Related research
Keywords: land tenancy; sharecropping; land contract choice; game theory;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Stahl, Dale II, 1990. "Bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 173-187, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1990. "Bargaining without commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 291-297, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 188-201, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bell, Clive & Zusman, Pinhas, 1976. "A Bargaining Theoretic Approach to Cropsharing Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 578-88, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Allen, Franklin, 1985. "On the Fixed Nature of Sharecropping Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(377), pages 30-48, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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