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Can Free Choice Be Known?

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  • Itzhak Gilboa

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this note we reconsider an argument, borrowed from causal decision theory, according to which rational and identical players should cooperate in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma. We argue that, regardless of how one views this type of reasoning, the example rpoints at a possible inconsistency in standard formulations of knowledge and decision. We suggest that when formalizing notions of "decision," "choice," and "rationality," care must be taken not to assume knowledge of one's own choice. Finally, the relationships to the classical problems of causal decision theory and of dterminism versus free will are briefly discussed.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Itzhak Gilboa, 1999. "Can Free Choice Be Known?," Post-Print hal-00756324, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00756324
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Ben-Porath, E., 1992. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games," Papers 14-92, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
    3. Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa, 1988. "Common knowledge," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 118, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    4. Bezalel Peleg & Menahem E. Yaari, 1973. "On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(3), pages 391-401.
    5. Peter J. Hammond, 1976. "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 43(1), pages 159-173.
    6. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1988. "Information dependent games : Can common sense be common knowledge?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 215-221.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giacomo Bonanno, 2018. "Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 1001-1032, September.
    2. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1997. "A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 25-30, July.
    3. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "Counterfactuals and the Prisoner?s Dilemma," Working Papers 137, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "Counterfactuals and the Prisoner?s Dilemma," Working Papers 6, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.

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    Free Choice;

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