Despite stringent dismissal restrictions in most European countries, rates of job creation and destruction are remarkably similar in European and Noeth American labor markets. This paper shows that relative-wage compression is conducive to higher employer-initiated job turnover, and argues that wage setting institutions and job-security provisions differ across countries that are both consistent with rough uniformity of job turnover statistics and readily explained by by inuitive theoretical considerations.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi in its series Papers with number
272.
Find related papers by JEL classification: J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald & Peter Sanfey, 1992.
"Wages, Profits and Rent-Sharing,"
NBER Working Papers
4222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.