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Designing stabilization policy in a monetary union

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Author Info
Russell Cooper
Hubert Kempf

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Abstract

The European Monetary Union (EMU) has become a reality, but economists nonetheless continue to debate the desirability and the optimal design of a monetary union. Since a union's essential element is delegation of monetary power to a single centralized entity, one of the key issues in this debate is whether a monetary union will limit the effectiveness of stabilization policy. If so, it will not necessarily be welfare-improving. Having studied a two-country world economy and considered various designs of monetary union, the authors argue that the success of monetary union depends on 1) the commitment ability of the single central bank; 2) the policy flexibility of national fiscal authorities and the central monetary authority; and 3) the cross-country correlation of shocks.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 0001.

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Length: 1-48
Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0001

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Arthur J. Rolnick & Bruce D. Smith & Warren E. Weber, 1993. "In order to form a more perfect monetary union," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 2-13. [Downloadable!]
  2. Poterba, James M, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 395-400, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Martin Feldstein, 1998. "The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability," NBER Working Papers 6150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Valerie R. Bencivenga & Elisabeth Huybens & Bruce Smith, 2001. "Dollarization and the integration of international capital markets; a contribution to the theory of optimal currency areas," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 548-596.
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  5. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum, 1992. "Liquidity effects and the monetary transmission mechanism," Staff Report 150, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Uhlig, H., 1997. "An analysis of the "stability pact"," Discussion Paper 59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Sebastian M. Saiegh & Mariano Tommasi, 1999. "Why is Argentina’s Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 169-209, May. [Downloadable!]
  8. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall. [Downloadable!]
  9. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "The EMU and the NAMU: What is the Case for North American Monetary Union?," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 25(3), pages 285-305, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Fuerst, Timothy S., 1992. "Liquidity, loanable funds, and real activity," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 3-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1990. "Liquidity and interest rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 237-264, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1998. "On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Working Papers 589, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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  13. David S. Hoelscher & Tomás J. T. Baliño & Jakob Horder, 1997. "Evolution of Monetary Policy Instruments in Russia," IMF Working Papers 97/180, International Monetary Fund.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Østrup, Finn, 2005. "Fiscal Policy and Welfare under Different Exchange Rate Regimes," Working Papers 2005-1, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance. [Downloadable!]
  2. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2008. "Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and debt management: a two-stage analysis," Empirica, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 433-448, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2002. "Overturning Mundell: fiscal policy in a monetary union," Staff Report 311, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Luisa Lambertini & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 2007. "Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union: Can Fiscal Cooperation be Counterproductive?," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 1707, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
  5. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2004. "Is it is or is it Ain't my Obligation? Regional Debt in Monetary Unions," NBER Working Papers 10239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Antoine Martin, 2002. "Endogenous multiple currencies," Research Working Paper RWP 02-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Roberto Tamborini, 2002. "One "monetary giant" with many "fiscal dwarfs": The efficiency of macroeconomic stabilization policies in the European Monetary Union," Department of Economics Working Papers 0204, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
  8. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2005. "Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination And Debt Management: A Two Stage Dynamic Analysis," Macroeconomics 0504024, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Michele Ca’ Zorzi & Roberto A. De Santis & Fabrizio Zampolli, 2005. "Welfare implications of joining a common currency," Working Paper Series 445, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  10. Marco BUTI & Werner ROEGER & Jan IN'T VELD, 2001. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions under a Stability Pact," Economics Working Papers ECO2001/08, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  11. Otmar Issing, 2002. "Anmerkungen zur Koordinierung der makroökonomischen Politik in der WWU," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(3), pages 312-324.
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