IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecr/col033/48720.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Exploring the elements of an optimal hydrocarbon fiscal regime

Author

Listed:
  • McLean, Sheldon

Abstract

The study analyzes the process for the awarding of blocks among select countries within the western hemisphere, namely Brazil, Guyana, Mexico, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. The findings allow for the determination of key elements of what can be considered an optimal hydrocarbon fiscal regime for Caribbean economies that would allow governments to get their fair share of hydrocarbon rents, while ensuring sufficient exploration and production activity. The study therefore suggests that for the Caribbean, the optimal fiscal regime should include a reservation price, royalties, and a windfall tax. Mindful of the sunk costs which may be incurred by the multinationals in exploration and production activities, invariably, fiscal incentives would be necessary. The study, however, argues in favor of collusion among oil and gas endowed regional countries in pursuit of hydrocarbon sector FDI. This would simultaneously avoid the proverbial race-to-the-bottom and go a long way in optimizing each country’s hydrocarbon rents.

Suggested Citation

  • McLean, Sheldon, 2023. "Exploring the elements of an optimal hydrocarbon fiscal regime," Studies and Perspectives – ECLAC Subregional Headquarters for The Caribbean 48720, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
  • Handle: RePEc:ecr:col033:48720
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/48720
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Josip Ivšinović & Vjekoslav Pleteš, 2021. "Risk and Financial Cost Management of Injection Wells in Mature Oil Fields," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-7, April.
    2. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    3. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    2. John García & Francesc Trillas, 2011. "Control corporativo y riqueza de los accionistas en el sector eléctrico europeo (2000-2007)," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 13(25), pages 297-319, July-Dece.
    3. Drabik Ewa, 2013. "Several Remarks on Banach–Mazur Games and its Applications Ewa Drabik," Foundations of Management, Sciendo, vol. 5(1), pages 1-5, June.
    4. Soumyakanti Chakraborty & Anup K. Sen & Amitava Bagchi, 2015. "Addressing the valuation problem in multi-round combinatorial auctions," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 1145-1160, October.
    5. A. Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2015. "An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 769-784, August.
    6. Christiane Ernst & Christian Thöni, 2013. "Bimodal Bidding in Experimental All-Pay Auctions," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(4), pages 1-16, October.
    7. Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April.
    8. Jonathan Levin & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2016. "Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2528-2551, September.
    9. Brânzei, R. & Fragnelli, V. & Meca, A. & Tijs, S.H., 2006. "Two Classes of Cooperative Games Related to One-Object Auction Situations," Discussion Paper 2006-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    10. Ganuza, Juan José & Viecens, María Fernanda, 2011. "Deployment of high-speed broadband infrastructures during the economic crisis. The case of Xarxa Oberta," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(9), pages 857-870.
    11. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7891 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Paul Klemperer, 2007. "Bidding Markets," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-47.
    13. Boitani, Andrea & Cambini, Carlo, 2006. "To bid or not to bid, this is the question: the Italian experience in competitive tendering for local bus services," European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration, issue 33, pages 41-53.
    14. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Holmes, Jessica & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2011. "Jumping and sniping at the silents: Does it matter for charities?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 395-402.
    15. Zhen Li & Ching-Chung Kuo, 2013. "Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 211(1), pages 255-272, December.
    16. Marco Scarsini & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Lowest Unique Bid Auctions," Papers 1007.4264, arXiv.org.
    17. Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 109-149, December.
    18. Estrella Alonso & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano & Juan Tejada, 2020. "Mixed Mechanisms for Auctioning Ranked Items," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(12), pages 1-26, December.
    19. Klemperer, Paul, 2009. "What is the Top Priority on Climate Change?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Gian Luigi Albano & Milo Bianchi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2006. "Bid Average Methods in Procurement," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 96(1), pages 41-62, January-F.
    21. Requate, Till & Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Kean Siang, Ch'ng & Waichman, Israel, 2019. "Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 133-152.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecr:col033:48720. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Biblioteca CEPAL (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eclaccl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.