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Leaving the prison: A discussion of the Iterated prisoner`s dilemma under preferential partner selection

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  • Hauk, Esther

Abstract

Outside prison agents do not only ehoose a game strategy but also a game partner. In this paper players are finite automata and willing to interaet only if their expected payoff exeeeds an endogenously evolving aeeeptable minimum. In the resulting behavioural strueture the initial population is subdivided aeeording to players' degree of exploitiveness. If the number of eooperators is at least two, eooperators will be better off than defeetors. If more sueeessful automata reproduce, simulations show that due to partner seleetion eooperative behaviour is irnmune to invading mutants even if the life-span of generations is short.

Suggested Citation

  • Hauk, Esther, 1997. "Leaving the prison: A discussion of the Iterated prisoner`s dilemma under preferential partner selection," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6056, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:6056
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    1. Ashlock, Dan & Smucker, Mark & Stanley, E. Ann & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1994. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," ISU General Staff Papers 199409010700001033, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Stanley, E. Ann & Ashlock, Dan & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1993. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," ISU General Staff Papers 199302010800001028, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    3. George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information 9410003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    5. Morikawa, Tomonori & Orbell, John M. & Runde, Audun S., 1995. "The Advantage of Being Moderately Cooperative," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 601-611, September.
    6. Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 1996. "Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(3), pages 491-519.
    7. Gordon Tullock, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(Supplemen), pages 1073-1081.
    8. Rudolf Schuessler, 1989. "Exit Threats and Cooperation under Anonymity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(4), pages 728-749, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Leigh S. Tesfatsion, "undated". "An Evolutionary Trade Network Game with Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _057, Society for Computational Economics.
    2. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1995. "A Trade Network Game with Endogenous Partner Selection," ISU General Staff Papers 199505010700001034, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1995. "How Economists Can Get Alife," Economic Reports 18196, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1998. "Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game," ISU General Staff Papers 199804010800001041, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

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