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Do we go shopping downtown or in the `burbs? Why not both?

Author

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  • Thisse, Jacques-François
  • Sloev, Igor
  • Ushchev, Philip

Abstract

We combine spatial and monopolistic competition to study market interactions between downtown retailers and an outlying shopping mall. Consumers shop at either marketplace or at both, and buy each variety in volume. The market solution stems from the interplay between the market expansion effect generated by consumers seeking more opportunities, and the ccompetition effect. Firms' profits increase (decrease) with the entry of local competitors when the former (latter) dominates. Downtown retailers swiftly vanish when the mall is large. A predatory but efficient mall need not be regulated, whereas the regulator must restrict the size of a mall accommodating downtown retailers.

Suggested Citation

  • Thisse, Jacques-François & Sloev, Igor & Ushchev, Philip, 2013. "Do we go shopping downtown or in the `burbs? Why not both?," CEPR Discussion Papers 9604, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9604
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    Cited by:

    1. Brandão, António & Correia-da-Silva, João & Pinho, Joana, 2014. "Spatial competition between shopping centers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 234-250.
    2. Mona Kashiha & Jean-Claude Thill, 2016. "Spatial competition and contestability based on choice histories of consumers," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(4), pages 877-894, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shopping behavior; Retailers; Shopping mall; Spatial comparison; Monopolistic competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
    • R10 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General

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