We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
7168.
Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2009.
"Disclosure by Politicians,"
NBER Working Papers
14703, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
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