IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/penntw/7942b6b570793de0891a05acb5d61374.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Working in Public and Private Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Giacomo Corneo
  • Rafael Rob

Abstract

We develop a theoretical framework for comparing the style of work in public and private enterprises. We incorporate ?socializing?, as an activity that yields utility for workers and affects a firm?s output, into a simple multitask model of work organization. In contrast with previous models, we establish the two following results. First, the optimal workers? compensation policy displays a larger incentive intensity in the private firm than in the public firm. Second, labour productivity in the private firm may be higher or lower than in the public firm. Both results fit well with the findings of empirical work.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Corneo & Rafael Rob, "undated". "Working in Public and Private Firms," Penn CARESS Working Papers 7942b6b570793de0891a05acb, Penn Economics Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:penntw:7942b6b570793de0891a05acb5d61374
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/Centers/CARESS/CARESSpdf/00-19.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State versus Private Ownership," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 133-150, Fall.
    2. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    3. Francois, Patrick, 2000. "'Public service motivation' as an argument for government provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 275-299, November.
    4. Boardman, Anthony E & Vining, Aidan R, 1989. "Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 1-33, April.
    5. Chamley, C. & Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P., 1989. "Linear incentive schemes to control public firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 5(2-3), pages 229-243.
    6. Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-636, May.
    7. Roemer, John E. & Silvestre, Joaquim, 1992. "A welfare comparison of private and public monopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 67-81, June.
    8. Preston, Anne E, 1988. "The Effects of Property Rights on Labor Costs of Nonprofit Firms: An Application to the Day Care Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 337-350, March.
    9. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Privatization and Incentives," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 84-105, Special I.
    11. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    12. Drago, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, January.
    13. Andrew E. Clark, 1996. "Job Satisfaction in Britain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 34(2), pages 189-217, June.
    14. CHAMLEY, Christophe & MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1989. "Linear incentive schemes to control public firms," LIDAM Reprints CORE 870, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. H. Naci Mocan & Erdal Tekin, 2003. "Nonprofit Sector and Part-Time Work: An Analysis of Employer-Employee Matched Data on Child Care Workers," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 38-50, February.
    16. Weiss, Andrew W, 1980. "Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 526-538, June.
    17. N. Foster & S.G.B. Henry & C. Trinder, 1984. "Public and Private Sector Pay: a Partly Disaggregated Study," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 107(1), pages 63-73, February.
    18. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    19. De Fraja, Giovanni, 1993. "Productive efficiency in public and private firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 15-30, January.
    20. Corneo, Giacomo & Rob, Rafael, 2003. "Working in public and private firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1335-1352, August.
    21. Atkinson, Scott E. & Halvorsen, Robert, 1986. "The relative efficiency of public and private firms in a regulated environment: The case of U.S. electric utilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 281-294, April.
    22. repec:sae:niesru:v:107:y::i:1:p:63-73 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Willner, Johan & Parker, David, 2002. "The Relative Performance of Public and Private Enterprise Under Conditions of Active and Passive Ownership," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30591, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    2. Paul H. Jensen & Robin E. Stonecash, 2004. "The Efficiency of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts: A Literature Review," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2004n29, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    3. Filippo Belloc, 2014. "Innovation in State-Owned Enterprises: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(3), pages 821-848.
    4. Paul H. Jensen & Robin E. Stonecash, 2005. "Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector‐outsourcing Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(5), pages 767-787, December.
    5. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2001. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
    6. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2002. "Monitoring and Productive Efficiency in Public and Private Firms," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(2), pages 167-187, February.
    8. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    9. Dietrichson, Jens, 2013. "Coordination Incentives, Performance Measurement and Resource Allocation in Public Sector Organizations," Working Papers 2013:26, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    10. Meyer, Margaret A. & Olsen, Trond E. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1996. "Limited intertemporal commitment and job design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 401-417, December.
    11. Holger MAHLENKAMP, 2015. "From State To Market Revisited: A Reassessment Of The Empirical Evidence On The Efficiency Of Public (And Privately-Owned) Enterprises," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(4), pages 535-557, December.
    12. Shibata, Takashi & Nishihara, Michi, 2011. "Interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information: Costs and benefits of privatized firms," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(3), pages 688-696, December.
    13. Yildiz, Özgür, 2016. "Public-private partnerships, incomplete contracts, and distributional fairness – when payments matter," MPRA Paper 74552, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1quv2b21ai9o7p6v4ihttv00hu is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Jiao Luo & Aseem Kaul, 2019. "Private action in public interest: The comparative governance of social issues," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 476-502, April.
    16. John E. Kwoka, 2005. "The comparative advantage of public ownership: evidence from U.S. electric utilities," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(2), pages 622-640, May.
    17. Lindqvist, Erik, 2007. "Will Privatization Reduce Costs?," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 660, Stockholm School of Economics.
    18. Fabio Monteduro, 2014. "Public–private versus public ownership and economic performance: evidence from Italian local utilities," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(1), pages 29-49, February.
    19. Flores-Fillol, Ricardo & Iranzo, Susana & Mane, Ferran, 2017. "Teamwork and delegation of decisions within the firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 1-29.
    20. Stefan Buehler & Simon Wey, 2014. "When Do State-Owned Firms Crowd Out Private Investment?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 319-330, September.
    21. Patrick Francois, 2003. "Not-For-Profit Provision of Public Services," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages 53-61, March.
    22. Illoong Kwon & Sangin Park, 2018. "Public–Private Mixed Delivery and Information Effects," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(337), pages 75-91, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:penntw:7942b6b570793de0891a05acb5d61374. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David K. Levine (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.