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Managerial Job Assignment and Imperfect Competition in Asymmetric Equilibrium

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Author Info
Volker Grossmann ()

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Abstract

This paper develops a model with multiple market locations in which the quality of intangible assets of firms, provided by management, determines the firms. performance. Despite an ex ante symmetry of potential entrants, the equilibrium assignment of heterogeneous managerial skills to firms tends to be asymmetric. This sorting outcome determines both the goods market structure at single locations and the size distribution of firms. Results are consistent with a number of observed patterns regarding the size distribution of firms and establishments, and the relation of firm size to profitability, productivity, managerial skills and manager remuneration.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 914.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_914

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Related research
Keywords: asymmetric equilibrium; firm size; intangible assets; managerial job assignment;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Christian Bayer & Carsten Burhop, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Incentive Contracts: Historical Evidence from a Legal Reform," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_11, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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