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Fiscal deficits and inflation risks: the role of fiscal and monetary policy regimes

Author

Listed:
  • Ryan Niladri Banerjee
  • Valerie Boctor
  • Aaron Mehrotra
  • Fabrizio Zampolli

Abstract

Using data from a panel of advanced economies over four decades, we show that the inflationary effect of fiscal deficits crucially depends on the prevailing fiscal-monetary policy regime. Under fiscal dominance, defined as a regime in which the government does not adjust the primary balance to stabilise debt and the central bank is less independent or puts less emphasis on price stability, the average effect on inflation of higher deficits is found to be up to five times larger than under monetary dominance. Under fiscal dominance, higher deficits also increase the dispersion of possible future inflationary outcomes, especially the probability of high inflation. Based on forecasts from our model, the high inflation experienced by many countries during the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic appears more consistent with a regime of fiscal dominance than monetary dominance.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan Niladri Banerjee & Valerie Boctor & Aaron Mehrotra & Fabrizio Zampolli, 2022. "Fiscal deficits and inflation risks: the role of fiscal and monetary policy regimes," BIS Working Papers 1028, Bank for International Settlements.
    • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:1028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal deficit; inflation; fiscal policy regime; monetary policy regime; monetary policy independence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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