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Interviewing Matching in Random Markets

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  • Maxwell Allman
  • Itai Ashlagi

Abstract

In many centralized labor markets candidates interview with potential employers before matches are formed through a clearinghouse One prominent example is the market for medical residencies and fellowships, which in recent years has had a large increase in the number of interviews. There have been numerous efforts to reduce the cost of interviewing in these markets using a variety of signalling mechanisms, however, the theoretical properties of these mechanisms have not been systematically studied in models with rich preferences. In this paper we give theoretical guarantees for a variety of mechanisms, finding that these mechanisms must properly balance competition. We consider a random market in which agents' latent preferences are based on observed qualities, personal taste and (ex post) interview shocks and assume that following an interview mechanism a final stable match is generated with respect to preferences over interview partners. We study a novel many-to-many interview match mechanism to coordinate interviews and that with relatively few interviews, when suitably designed, the interview match yields desirable properties. We find that under the interview matching mechanism with a limit of $k$ interviews per candidate and per position, the fraction of positions that are unfilled vanishes quickly with $k$. Moreover the ex post efficiency grows rapidly with $k$, and reporting sincere pre-interview preferences to this mechanism is an $\epsilon$-Bayes Nash equilibrium. Finally, we compare the performance of the interview match to other signalling and coordination mechanisms from the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Maxwell Allman & Itai Ashlagi, 2023. "Interviewing Matching in Random Markets," Papers 2305.11350, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2305.11350
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Federico Echenique & Ruy González & Alistair J. Wilson & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 223-238, June.
    2. Peter Coles & Alexey Kushnir & Muriel Niederle, 2013. "Preference Signaling in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 99-134, May.
    3. Robin S. Lee & Michael Schwarz, 2017. "Interviewing in two-sided matching markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(3), pages 835-855, August.
    4. Soohyung Lee & Muriel Niederle, 2015. "Propose with a rose? Signaling in internet dating markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 731-755, December.
    5. Simon Mauras, 2020. "Two-Sided Random Matching Markets: Ex-Ante Equivalence of the Deferred Acceptance Procedures," Papers 2005.08584, arXiv.org.
    6. Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Yash Kanoria & Peng Shi, 2020. "Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2163-2193, May.
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