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Reply: "Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game: The Walrasian Fixed-Supply Conjecture Model, Contest-Nash Equilibrium, and the Invariance Principle"

Author

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  • Stefan Szymanski

    (Tanaka Business School, Imperial College London)

Abstract

Szymanski (2004) explained that at a noncooperative Nash equilibrium for talent choice in a team sports league, revenue sharing will lead to a less-balanced distribution of talent (assuming teams have asymmetric revenue-generating potential). This proposition contradicts the well-known invariance principle. Eckard suggests that these results rest on assumptions about the elasticity of talent supply. This reply explains that this is not the case and that revenue sharing leads to a reduction in competitive balance, whether the supply of talent is elastic or not.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Szymanski, 2006. "Reply: "Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game: The Walrasian Fixed-Supply Conjecture Model, Contest-Nash Equilibrium, and the Invariance Principle"," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 7(2), pages 240-243, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:7:y:2006:i:2:p:240-243
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002504272948
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Madden, 2010. "Gametheoretic analysis of basic team sports leagues," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1006, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    2. Masaki Fujimoto, 2020. "Equal Revenue Sharing and the Optimal Distribution of Talent in the N-Team Leagues," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(2), pages 103-114, February.
    3. Eberhard Feess & Frank Stähler, 2009. "Revenue Sharing In Professional Sports Leagues," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(2), pages 255-265, May.
    4. Paul Madden, 2011. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Basic Team Sports Leagues," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(4), pages 407-431, August.
    5. Runkel Marco, 2011. "Revenue Sharing, Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 256-273, August.
    6. Rodney Fort & Jason Winfree, 2009. "Sports Really are Different: The Contest Success Function and the Supply of Talent," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(1), pages 69-80, February.
    7. Masaki Fujimoto, 2023. "A Dynamic Analysis of Equal Revenue Sharing and Endogenous Salary Caps in the N-Team Leagues," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 24(5), pages 624-638, June.
    8. Markus LANG & Alexander RATHKE & Marco RUNKEL, 2010. "The Economic Consequences Of Foreigner Rules In National Sports Leagues," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 31, pages 47-64.
    9. Stefan Szymanski & Stefan Késenne, 2010. "Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team Sports," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Comparative Economics of Sport, chapter 7, pages 229-243, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. Paul Madden, 2015. "“Walrasian Fixed Supply Conjecture†Versus “Contest-Nash†Solutions to Sports League Models," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 16(5), pages 540-551, June.
    11. Kato, Kazuhiko, 2023. "Effects of a uniform relative emission standard in a professional team sports league," MPRA Paper 117009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. John Vrooman, 2015. "Sportsman Leagues," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 62(1), pages 90-115, February.
    13. Paul Madden, 2017. "Comment on Driskill and Vrooman," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 18(3), pages 271-281, April.
    14. Mongeon, Kevin & Winfree, Jason, 2012. "Cross-ownership, league policies and player investment across sports leagues," MPRA Paper 39218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Marco Runkel, 2022. "Player Mobility and Competitive Balance Regulation in Professional Sports Leagues," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 23(4), pages 479-500, May.
    16. Kevin Mongeon & Jason Winfree, 2013. "The Effects of Cross-Ownership and League Policies Across Sports Leagues Within a City," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 43(3), pages 145-162, November.
    17. Jason Winfree & Rodney Fort, 2012. "Nash Conjectures and Talent Supply in Sports League Modeling," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 13(3), pages 306-313, June.
    18. Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang, 2009. "Contest Theory and its Applications in Sports," Working Papers 0105, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).

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