We analyze a two-sided search model in which we assume utility is not perfectly transferable. Except for this assumption the model is standard, yet it generates results that are quite different from those obtained in models with transferable utility. In particular, the model has multiple equilibria, even with constant returns to scale in the meeting technology. We also provide conditions to guarantee uniqueness in equilibrium search models with or without transferable utility. These conditions apply even with increasing returns in the meeting technology. Examples and applications are discussed. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.
Volume (Year): 1 (1998) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 220-245 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Paper
Kenneth Burdett & Randall Wright, 1994.
"Two-sided search,"
Staff Report
169, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Costly Search and Recruiting,"
International Economic Review,
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Howitt, Peter & McAfee, R Preston, 1992.
"Animal Spirits,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 493-507, June.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, .
"Income Taxation and Marital Decisions,"
Working Papers
2133479, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
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Russo, Giovanni & Gorter, Cees & Schettkat, Ronald, 1997.
"Searching, ranking and hiring,"
Serie Research Memoranda
0017, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
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Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, 2002.
"Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search Analysis,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 955-986, August.
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