The worldwide problem with pay-as-you-go, defined-benefits social security systems isn't just financial. Through a dynamic, overlapping-generations model where forming a family and bearing and educating children are choice variables, we show that social security taxes and benefits generate incentives to reduce both family formation and fertility, and that these effects cannot be fully neutralized by counteracting inter-temporal or intergenerational transfers within families. We implement the model using calibrated simulations as well as panel data from 57 countries over 32 years. We find that PAYG tax measures account for a non-trivial part of the downward trends in family formation and fertility worldwide, especially in OECD countries. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.
Volume (Year): 10 (2007) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 55-77 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Michele Boldrin & Maria Cristina De Nardi & Larry E. Jones, 2005.
"Fertility and Social Security,"
Levine's Bibliography
666156000000000506, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Michele Boldrin & Mariacristina De Nardi & Larry E. Jones, 2005.
"Fertility and Social Security,"
NBER Working Papers
11146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Michele Boldrin & Mariacristina De Nardi & Larry E. Jones, 2005.
"Fertility and Social Security,"
Staff Report
359, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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Boadway, Robin W & Wildasin, David E, 1989.
"A Median Voter Model of Social Security,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(2), pages 307-28, May.
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