MARCOS SINGER () (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)
Abstract
One of the main causes of the unemployment in low-qualification socioeconomic sectors is the problem of asymmetry of information: firms ignore the true predisposition of the candidates to commit with the job, and facing such uncertainty, they deter from contracting personnel. Using an optimization model, based on the revelation principle for games of incomplete information, we deduce that the public system should offer to those candidates willing to commit salaries too high in order to distinguish them from other candidates. That is why the public system only offers low-commitment transitory jobs, leaving out of the intermediation system the unemployed people with the highest potential. As an alternative, we propose to implement a mixed public-private system, in which the public agencies would specialize on transitory jobs, and the private agencies on higher commitment jobs. In such a case, the salaries for the latter jobs would be realistic, so people with a high potential would participate in the intermediation system.
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Article provided by Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal ABANTE.
Volume (Year): 8 (2005) Issue (Month): 2 () Pages: 37-58 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
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