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Self-Sabotage

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  • David Sappington
  • Dennis Weisman

Abstract

We analyze the incentives of a vertically-integrated producer (VIP) to engage in “self-sabotage”.Self-sabotage occurs when a VIP intentionally increases its upstream costs and/or reduces the quality of its upstream product. We identify conditions under which self-sabotage is profitable for the VIP even though it raises symmetrically the cost of the upstream product to all downstream producers and/or reduces symmetrically the quality of all downstream products. Under specified conditions, self-sabotage can enable a VIP to disadvantage downstream rivals differentially without violating parity requirements. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • David Sappington & Dennis Weisman, 2005. "Self-Sabotage," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 155-175, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:27:y:2005:i:2:p:155-175
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-004-5342-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bustos Alvaro E & Galetovic Alexander, 2009. "Vertical Integration and Sabotage with a Regulated Bottleneck Monopoly," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-52, September.
    2. David Mandy & David Sappington, 2007. "Incentives for sabotage in vertically related industries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 235-260, June.
    3. Seade, J., 1985. "Profitable Cost Increases and the Shifting of Taxation: Equilibrium Responses of Markets in Oligopoly," Economic Research Papers 269225, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    4. Seade, J, 1985. "Profitable Cost Increases and the Shifting of Taxation : Equilibrium Response of Markets in Oligopoly," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 260, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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    Keywords

    regulation; parity; sabotage;
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