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Chameleon voters and public choice

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  • Timur Kuran

Abstract

A model is presented of an open-voting public choice process that features pressure groups vying for society's support. Individuals choose what policy to advocate on the basis of their private preferences, which are those they would express in a secret ballot; endogenous social pressures; and the utility they gain from integrity. They falsify their preferences when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. An implication is that a policy advocated by few people in private might receive strong public support. The paper goes on to explore why secret voting, which eliminates this possibility, might not be adopted. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987

Suggested Citation

  • Timur Kuran, 1987. "Chameleon voters and public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 53-78, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:53:y:1987:i:1:p:53-78
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00115654
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gerling, Lena & Kellermann, Kim Leonie, 2022. "Contagious populists: The impact of election information shocks on populist party preferences in Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    2. Shyam Gouri Suresh & Scott Jeffrey, 2017. "The Consequences of Social Pressures on Partisan Opinion Dynamics," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 242-259, March.
    3. David Jimenez-Gomez, 2021. "Social Pressure in Networks Induces Public Good Provision," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-17, January.
    4. William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, 1993. "A Threshold Model of Electoral Policy and Voter Turnout," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(1), pages 107-126, January.
    5. Johanna Mollerstrom, 2022. "Favoritism and cooperation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 293-307, June.
    6. Willemien Kets & Alvaro Sandroni, 2021. "A Theory of Strategic Uncertainty and Cultural Diversity," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(1), pages 287-333.
    7. Gerling, Lena & Kellermann, Kim Leonie, 2019. "The impact of election information shocks on populist party preferences: Evidence from Germany," CIW Discussion Papers 3/2019, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    8. Klick, Jonathan & Parisi, Francesco, 2008. "Social networks, self-denial, and median preferences: Conformity as an evolutionary strategy," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1319-1327, August.
    9. Stephen Kinsella, 2009. "Preference Falsification in Teaching," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 6(3), pages 352-358, September.
    10. Francisco J. León-Medina & Jordi Tena-Sánchez & Francisco J. Miguel, 2020. "Fakers becoming believers: how opinion dynamics are shaped by preference falsification, impression management and coherence heuristics," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 385-412, April.
    11. Timur Kuran, 1989. "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 41-74, April.

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