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The positive theory of legislative institutions: an enrichment of social choice and spatial models

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  • Kenneth Shepsle

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  • Kenneth Shepsle, 1986. "The positive theory of legislative institutions: an enrichment of social choice and spatial models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 135-178, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:50:y:1986:i:1:p:135-178
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124930
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James Enelow & Melvin Hinisch, 1983. "On Plott's pairwise symmetry condition for majority rule equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 317-321, January.
    2. Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
    3. Ferejohn, John A & Fiorina, Morris P, 1975. "Purposive Models of Legislative Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 407-414, May.
    4. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    5. Denzau, Arthur T. & Parks, Robert P., 1977. "A problem with public sector preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 454-457, April.
    6. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    7. Fiorina, Morris P. & Plott, Charles R., 1978. "Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 575-598, June.
    8. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    9. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    10. Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1972. "The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 555-568, June.
    11. McKelvey, Richard D. & Schofield, Norman, 1986. "Structural instability of the core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 179-198, June.
    12. Denzau, Arthur T. & Parks, Robert P., 1979. "Deriving public sector preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 335-352, June.
    13. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    14. Schofield, Norman, 1977. "Transitivity of preferences on a smooth manifold of alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 149-171, February.
    15. Slutsky, Steven, 1977. "A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 299-325, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tore Sager, 2001. "Positive Theory of Planning: The Social Choice Approach," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 33(4), pages 629-647, April.
    2. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1988. "Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 239-252, December.
    3. Keith Dowding, 1994. "The Compatibility of Behaviouralism, Rational Choice and `New Institutionalism'," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(1), pages 105-117, January.
    4. Tore Sager, 2001. "Planning Style and Agency Properties," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 33(3), pages 509-532, March.
    5. Mason Dyana P., 2017. "Measuring Latent Constructs in Nonprofit Surveys with Item Response Theory: The Example of Political Ideology," Nonprofit Policy Forum, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 91-110, January.
    6. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    7. Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, 1994. "Congress and Railroad Regulation: 1874 to 1887," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 81-120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Kenneth A. Shepsle, 1989. "Studying Institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(2), pages 131-147, April.

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