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Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?

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  • Dinko Dimitrov
  • Claus-Jochen Haake

Abstract

We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the "most" stable government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic Party.
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Suggested Citation

  • Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 115-128, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:89:y:2006:i:2:p:115-128
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-006-0207-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    2. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    3. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung, 2006. "A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2006.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2006. "Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 12175, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    5. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Harrie de Swart & Jan-Willem van der Rijt, 2005. "A new model of coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 129-154, September.
    6. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    7. Georg Kirchsteiger & Clemens Puppe, 1997. "On the Formation of Political Coalitions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(2), pages 293-293, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ciftci, B.B. & Dimitrov, D.A., 2006. "Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control," Discussion Paper 2006-114, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2011. "Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 378, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    3. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2008. "A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 571-579, May.
    4. Dominik Karos, 2013. "Coalition Formation in General Apex Games," Economics Series Working Papers 680, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    5. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006. "Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core," Working Papers 2006.72, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Dinko Dimitrov, 2006. "Top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(12), pages 1-6.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:12:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Dominik Karos, 2013. "Bargaining and Power," Working Papers 2013.63, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    9. Dominik Karos, 2012. "Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games," Working Papers 2012.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    10. Karos, Dominik, 2014. "Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 239-252.
    11. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2008. "Stable governments and the semistrict core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 460-475, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    coalition formation; Shapley value; simple games; winning coalitions; D72; C71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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