We explore to what extent we can propose fixed negotiation rules as well as simple mechanisms (or protocols) that guarantee that politi¬cal parties can form stable coalition-governments. We analyze the case where three parties can hold office in the form of two-party coalitions. We define the family of Weighted Rules, that select political agree¬ments as a function of the bliss-points of the parties, and electoral results (Camson's Law and equal-share among others are included). We show that every weighted rule yields a stable coalition. We make use of the theory of implementation to design a protocol (in the form of a mechanism) that guarantees that a stable coalition will govern. We find that no dominant-solvable mechanism can be used for this purpose, but there is a simultaneous-unanimity mechanism that im¬plements it in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number
2009-3.
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