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Marriage Formation/Dissolution and Marital Distribution in a Two-Period Economic Model of Matching with Cooperative Bargaining

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Abstract

We study the problem of marriage formation and marital distribution in a two-period model of matching, extending the matching with bargaining framework of Crawford and Rochford (1986). We run simulations to find the effects of alimony rate and legal cost of divorce parameters on the payoffs and marital status in the society.

Suggested Citation

  • Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "Marriage Formation/Dissolution and Marital Distribution in a Two-Period Economic Model of Matching with Cooperative Bargaining," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 11(4), pages 1-3.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2007-85-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Naoki Shiba, 2013. "Analysis of Asymmetric Two-Sided Matching: Agent-Based Simulation with Theorem-Proof Approach," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 16(3), pages 1-11.
    2. Ismail Saglam, 2014. "Simple Heuristics as Equilibrium Strategies in Mutual Sequential Mate Search," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 17(1), pages 1-12.
    3. Ismail Saglam, 2013. "Divorce Costs and Marital Dissolution in a One-to-One Matching Framework With Nontransferable Utilities," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-19, March.
    4. Lyndon Walker & Peter Davis, 2013. "Modelling "Marriage Markets": A Population-Scale Implementation and Parameter Test," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 16(1), pages 1-6.
    5. Lillian Pazvakawambwa & Nelago Indongo & Lawrence N Kazembe, 2013. "Explaining Marital Patterns and Trends in Namibia: A Regression Analysis of 1992, 2000 and 2006 Demographic and Survey Data," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(8), pages 1-11, August.

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