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Does the winner take it all? Federal policies and political extremism

Author

Listed:
  • Daniele, Gianmarco
  • Piolatto, Amedeo
  • Sas, Willem

Abstract

Whether citizens like or dislike federal policies often depends on regional differences. Because of geography, (economic) history or other path-dependent factors, certain regions are perceived to get more out of the union than others. We show that citizens, therefore, have a strategic incentive to elect Federal delegates that are more extreme than the representative voter. The intensity of such strategic delegation is U-shaped in expected benefits. The predictions of our model hence rationalise the voting differences we observe in the data between national and EU elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniele, Gianmarco & Piolatto, Amedeo & Sas, Willem, 2024. "Does the winner take it all? Federal policies and political extremism," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:105:y:2024:i:c:s0166046224000103
    DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2024.103986
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federalism; Strategic delegation; Political extremism; Populism; European elections; Euroscepticism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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