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The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition

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Author Info
A. Lizzeri
N. Persico

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Paper provided by Economics Department, Princeton University in its series Princeton Economic Theory Papers with number 00s14.

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Date of creation: Mar 2000
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Handle: RePEc:wop:prinet:00s14

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics With Rational Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 2051, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1984. "Spatial Equilibrium with Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(1), pages 139-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, . ""The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives''," CARESS Working Papres 98-08, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1999. "Public Goods And Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1243-1284, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  8. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Fernández, Raquel & Levy, Gilat, 2005. "Class and Tastes: The Effects of Income and Preference Heterogeneity on Redistribution," CEPR Discussion Papers 4834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Eric Maskin, 2003. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Efe Ok, 2004. "Multidimensional income taxation and electoral competition: an equilibrium analysis," Departmental Working Papers 200407, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-24.


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