This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Incomplete information and optimal market structure public purchases from private providers

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
McGuire, Thomas G.
Riordan, Michael H.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-3YYTF1B-G/2/ed7e9ea085ba5cd5cc9a31c70e129397
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 56 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 125-141
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:56:y:1995:i:1:p:125-141

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Bruno Cassiman, 1994. "Research Joint Ventures and Optimal R&D Policy with Asymmetric Information," Economics Working Papers 263, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1997. [Downloadable!]
  2. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre, 2008. "Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly," IDEI Working Papers 382, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Tournas, Yanni, 2000. "In-House Competition, Organizational Slack and the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 2557, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Yongmin Chen & Ruqu Wang, 2005. "Market Design with Correlated Valuations," Working Papers 1034, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2000. "Implementing Efficient Market Structure," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Asher Wolinsky, 1993. "Regulation of Duopoly Under Asymmetric Information: Prices VS Quantities," Discussion Papers 1061, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2000. "License Auctions and Market Structure," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. E Auriol & P M Picard, 2004. "Liberal Regulation: Privatization of Natural Monopolies with Adverse Selection," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0403, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Bruno Cassiman, 1994. "Research Joint Ventures and Optimal R&D Policy with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 1105, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 142, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Evenett, Simon J & Hoekman, Bernard, 2003. "Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 4109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 1999. "Procurement and Information Feedback," Research Papers in Economics 2000:2, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Emmanuelle Auriol, 1993. "Monopole ou duopole: l'effet de comparaison," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 31, pages 01, Juillet-S. [Downloadable!]
  14. Martin K Perry & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Auctions for Split-Award Contracts," ESE Discussion Papers 90, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.