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Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 296-307
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:18:y:1987:i:summer:p:296-307

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