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How the demand for insurance became behavioral

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  • Corcos, Anne
  • Montmarquette, Claude
  • Pannequin, François

Abstract

Recent developments in research on insurance reveal a shift towards behavioral insurance. Decisions remain rational but in a broader framework of reference that accounts for the role of loss aversion, ambiguity, framing, reference points, and emotions in people's decisions. In this special issue, many of those points are discussed in connection with the demand for insurance. Some of the major insurance puzzles, such as insufficient demand for coverage, the crowding-out effect between insurance mechanisms, and the opportunism in the insurance market that arises from asymmetric information are covered. This paper introduces 24 texts on behavioral insurance.

Suggested Citation

  • Corcos, Anne & Montmarquette, Claude & Pannequin, François, 2020. "How the demand for insurance became behavioral," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 590-595.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:180:y:2020:i:c:p:590-595
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Shawn Cole & Xavier Gine & Jeremy Tobacman & Petia Topalova & Robert Townsend & James Vickery, 2013. "Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 104-135, January.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Kunal Rajesh Lahoti & Shivani Hanji & Pratik Kamble & Kavita Vemuri, 2023. "Impact of Loss-Framing and Risk Attitudes on Insurance Purchase: Insights from a Game-like Interface Study," Papers 2310.13300, arXiv.org.
    3. Eling, Martin & Ghavibazoo, Omid & Hanewald, Katja, 2021. "Willingness to take financial risks and insurance holdings: A European survey," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    4. Hwang, In Do, 2024. "Behavioral aspects of household portfolio choice: Effects of loss aversion on life insurance uptake and savings," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(PA), pages 1029-1053.
    5. Feng, Jingbing & Xu, Xian & Zou, Hong, 2023. "Risk communication clarity and insurance demand: The case of the COVID-19 pandemic," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    6. Milos Borozan & Loreta Cannito & Barbara Luppi, 2022. "A tale of two ambiguities: A conceptual overview of findings from economics and psychology," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 6(S1), pages 11-21, July.

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