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Signal-jamming in the frequency domain

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  • Taub, B.

Abstract

I examine strategic behavior for a duopoly in a noisy environment. Firms attempt to learn the value of the rival's privately observed demand shocks via a noisy signal of price, and at the same time firms attempt to obfuscate that signal by producing excess output on the publicly observable signals, that is, they signal jam.

Suggested Citation

  • Taub, B., 2023. "Signal-jamming in the frequency domain," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 896-930.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:896-930
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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