IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v95y2017icp38-61.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Managing innovation: Optimal incentive contracts for delegated R&D with double moral hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Poblete, Joaquín
  • Spulber, Daniel

Abstract

Managing innovation involves double moral hazard because the principal delegates R&D to a specialized agent and then makes decisions to apply the resulting invention. Double moral hazard is significant because innovation by the principal implies that the optimal incentive contract satisfies monotonicity conditions. The analysis shows that the optimal incentive contract for delegated R&D is an option. Delegated R&D with simultaneous sampling results in shirking but delegated R&D with sequential sampling attains the efficient outcome. The analysis considers a combined problem with simultaneous and sequential search and gives sufficient conditions under which delegated R&D attains the first best. The discussion also considers delegated R&D with stochastic innovation and with stochastic quality of inventions.

Suggested Citation

  • Poblete, Joaquín & Spulber, Daniel, 2017. "Managing innovation: Optimal incentive contracts for delegated R&D with double moral hazard," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 38-61.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:95:y:2017:i:c:p:38-61
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001429211730051X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Motivating Innovation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1823-1860, October.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1989. "Agency costs and innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 305-327, December.
    3. Benhabib, Jess & Bull, Clive, 1983. "Job Search: The Choice of Intensity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 747-764, October.
    4. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    5. Spulber, Daniel F., 2008. "Innovation and international trade in technology," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 1-20, January.
    6. Bryan, Stephen & Hwang, LeeSeok & Lilien, Steven, 2000. "CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 661-693, October.
    7. Jeff S. Armstrong & Michael R. Darby & Lynne G. Zucker, 2003. "Commercializing knowledge: university science, knowledge capture and firm performance in biotechnology," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Sep, pages 149-170.
    8. Joaquín Poblete & Daniel Spulber, 2012. "The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(2), pages 215-234, June.
    9. Josh Lerner & Julie Wulf, 2007. "Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from Corporate R&D," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(4), pages 634-644, November.
    10. Josh Lerner & Ulrike Malmendier, 2010. "Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 214-246, March.
    11. Carolin Haeussler & Matthew J. Higgins, 2014. "Strategic Alliances: Trading Ownership for Capabilities," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 178-203, March.
    12. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey: Part I," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(2), pages 155-189, June.
    13. Nisvan Erkal & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2009. "Scarcity of Ideas and R&D Options: Use it, Lose it or Bank it," NBER Working Papers 14940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Holmström, Bengt, 1989. "Agency Costs and Innovation," Working Paper Series 214, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    15. Fredrik Andersson & Matthew Freedman & John Haltiwanger & Julia Lane & Kathryn Shaw, 2009. "Reaching for the Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative Industries?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(538), pages 308-332, June.
    16. Spulber, Daniel F., 1980. "Research and development of a backstop energy technology in a growing economy," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 199-207, October.
    17. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315.
    18. Spulber,Daniel F., 2014. "The Innovative Entrepreneur," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107047259, November.
    19. Georg Noeldeke & Klaus Schmidt, 1998. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 633-653, Winter.
    20. Arup Bose & Debashis Pal & David E. M. Sappington, 2011. "On the Performance of Linear Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 159-193, March.
    21. Estelle Dhont-Peltrault & Etienne Pfister, 2011. "R&D cooperation versus R&D subcontracting: empirical evidence from French survey data," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(4), pages 309-341.
    22. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Martinez-Giralt, Xavier & David Perez-Castrillo, J., 1996. "The role of information in licensing contract design," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 43-57, January.
    23. Marco LiCalzi & Sandrine Spaeter, 2003. "Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(1), pages 167-173, January.
    24. Pierre Azoulay & Joshua S. Graff Zivin & Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Incentives and creativity: evidence from the academic life sciences," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 527-554, September.
    25. Ryan, Harley Jr. & Wiggins, Roy III, 2001. "The influence of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 101-123, June.
    26. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The Management of Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1185-1209.
    27. Kloyer, Martin & Scholderer, Joachim, 2012. "Effective incomplete contracts and milestones in market-distant R&D collaboration," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 346-357.
    28. Bronwyn Hall, 2004. "The financing of research and development," Chapters, in: Anthony Bartzokas & Sunil Mani (ed.), Financial Systems, Corporate Investment in Innovation, and Venture Capital, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    29. Marie Thursby & Richard Jensen, 2001. "Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 240-259, March.
    30. Weitzman, Martin L, 1979. "Optimal Search for the Best Alternative," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 641-654, May.
    31. Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, 2010. "Ideas for rent: an overview of markets for technology," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 19(3), pages 775-803, June.
    32. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
    33. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    34. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    35. Morgan, Peter & Manning, Richard, 1985. "Optimal Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 923-944, July.
    36. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June.
    37. Robert Lowe, 2006. "Who Develops a University Invention? The Impact of Tacit Knowledge and Licensing Policies," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 415-429, July.
    38. Tracy R. Lewis, 2012. "A theory of delegated search for the best alternative," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 391-416, September.
    39. Pakes, Ariel S, 1986. "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 755-784, July.
    40. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
    41. Spulber, Daniel F., 2012. "Tacit knowledge with innovative entrepreneurship," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 641-653.
    42. Arvids A. Ziedonis, 2007. "Real Options in Technology Licensing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(10), pages 1618-1633, October.
    43. Spulber, Daniel F., 2010. "The quality of innovation and the extent of the market," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 260-270, March.
    44. Peter B. Morgan, 1983. "Search and Optimal Sample Sizes," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 659-675.
    45. Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1991. "Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 232-240, Summer.
    46. Lazear, Edward P, 1997. "Incentives in Basic Research," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 167-197, January.
    47. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 347-368, September.
    48. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    49. Daniel F. Spulber, 2015. "How Patents Provide The Foundation Of The Market For Inventions," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 271-316.
    50. John Hagedoorn, 2003. "Sharing intellectual property rights--an exploratory study of joint patenting amongst companies," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 12(5), pages 1035-1050, October.
    51. Gal, Shmuel & Landsberger, Michael & Levykson, Benny, 1981. "A Compound Strategy for Search in the Labor Market," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(3), pages 597-608, October.
    52. Baye, Michael R. & Hoppe, Heidrun C., 2003. "The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 217-226, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yunjuan Liang & Xin Liang & Hua Wei, 2023. "Sustainable Quality-Incentive Contract Design of Public Technology Innovation Procurement under Asymmetry Information," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-22, May.
    2. Bhattacharjee, Swagata, 2022. "Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 534-552.
    3. Benkert, Jean-Michel & Letina, Igor & Nöldeke, Georg, 2018. "Optimal search from multiple distributions with infinite horizon," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 15-18.
    4. Ni, Jian & Xu, Yue & Shi, Jia & Li, Jiali, 2024. "Product innovation in a supply chain with information asymmetry: Is more private information always worse?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 314(1), pages 229-240.
    5. Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity," Working Papers 1022, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2019.
    6. Congli Su & Mingxi Wang, 2022. "Quality incentive contract design in government procurement for innovation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3665-3684, December.
    7. Joosung Lee & Daniel Li, 2022. "Sequential Search With Adaptive Intensity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 803-829, May.
    8. Abdol Majid Saadat Nezhad & Tahmoures Sohrabi & Nasrollah Shadnoosh & Abbas Toloie Eshlaghy, 2017. "A New Approach to Challenges of Venture Capital in Financing the Industrial Clusters through Cooperative Models and Venture Funds in Iran," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(6), pages 111-119.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Spulber, Daniel F., 2012. "Tacit knowledge with innovative entrepreneurship," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 641-653.
    2. Hasan, Iftekhar & (Stan) Hoi, Chun-Keung & Wu, Qiang & Zhang, Hao, 2020. "Is social capital associated with corporate innovation? Evidence from publicly listed firms in the U.S," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    3. Lacetera, Nicola & Zirulia, Lorenzo, 2012. "Individual preferences, organization, and competition in a model of R&D incentive provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 550-570.
    4. Lin, Yongjia & Fu, Xiaoqing & Fu, Xiaolan, 2021. "Varieties in state capitalism and corporate innovation: Evidence from an emerging economy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    5. Caroline Flammer & Aleksandra Kacperczyk, 2016. "The Impact of Stakeholder Orientation on Innovation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(7), pages 1982-2001, July.
    6. Grosfeld-Nir, Abraham & Sarne, David & Spiegler, Israel, 2009. "Modeling the search for the least costly opportunity," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 197(2), pages 667-674, September.
    7. Onur Bayar & Thomas J. Chemmanur & Mark H. Liu, "undated". "How to Motivate Fundamental Innovation: Subsidies versus Prizes and the Role of Venture Capital," Working Papers 0175fin, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio, revised 06 Jan 2016.
    8. d’Andria, D. & Savin, I., 2018. "A Win-Win-Win? Motivating innovation in a knowledge economy with tax incentives," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 38-56.
    9. Diego d'Andria & Ivan Savin, 2015. "Motivating innovation in a knowledge economy with tax incentives," Jena Economics Research Papers 2015-004, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    10. Z. Jun Lin & Shengqiang Liu & Fangcheng Sun, 2017. "The Impact of Financing Constraints and Agency Costs on Corporate R&D Investment: Evidence from China," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 17(1), pages 3-42, March.
    11. Ramana Nanda & William R. Kerr, 2015. "Financing Innovation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 445-462, December.
    12. Maurseth, Per Botolf & Svensson, Roger, 2020. "The Importance of Tacit Knowledge: Dynamic Inventor Activity in the Commercialization Phase," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(7).
    13. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
    14. Nishimura, Junichi & Okamuro, Hiroyuki, 2018. "Internal and external discipline: The effect of project leadership and government monitoring on the performance of publicly funded R&D consortia," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 840-853.
    15. Ziyang Li & Qianwei Ying & Wu Yan & Chenjun Fan, 2022. "Does just‐in‐time adoption have an impact on corporate innovation: evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(S1), pages 1599-1635, April.
    16. Bakker, Gerben, 2013. "Money for nothing: How firms have financed R&D-projects since the Industrial Revolution," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(10), pages 1793-1814.
    17. Wang, Lin & Tang, Yingkai & Chen, Yaozhi & Wang, Kun, 2021. "Be a better boss. Employee treatment, trust level and family business innovation: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    18. Li, Tao & Wang, Yan, 2022. "Corporate responsibility towards employees and innovation: Evidence from an emerging market," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    19. Guariglia, Alessandra & Liu, Pei, 2014. "To what extent do financing constraints affect Chinese firms' innovation activities?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 223-240.
    20. Zhao, Qifeng & Li, Zhen & Yu, Yihua, 2021. "Does top management quality promote innovation? Firm-level evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    R&D; Invention; Innovation; Contract; Principal; Agent; Incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:95:y:2017:i:c:p:38-61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.