IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejtec/v18y2018i1p11n7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bargaining Frictions in Trading Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Polanski Arnold

    (School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, NorwichNR4 7TJ, UK)

  • Vega-Redondo Fernando

    (Department of Decision Sciences, Bocconi University & IGIER, Milano, Lombardia, Italy)

Abstract

In the canonical model of frictionless markets, arbitrage is usually taken to force all trades of homogeneous goods to occur at essentially the same price. In the real world, however, arbitrage possibilities are often severely restricted and this may lead to substantial price heterogeneity. Here we focus on frictions that can be modeled as the bargaining constraints induced by an incomplete trading network. In this context, the interplay among the architecture of the trading network, the buyers’ valuations, and the sellers’ costs shapes the effective arbitrage possibilities of the economy. We characterize the configurations that, at an intertemporal bargaining equilibrium, lead to a uniform price. Conceptually, this characterization involves studying how the network positions and valuations/costs of any given set of buyers and sellers affect their collective bargaining power relative to a notional or benchmark situation in which the connectivity is complete. Mathematically, the characterizing conditions can be understood as price-based counterparts of those identified by the celebrated Marriage Theorem in matching theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Polanski Arnold & Vega-Redondo Fernando, 2018. "Bargaining Frictions in Trading Networks," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-11, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:1:p:11:n:7
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0089
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0089
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/bejte-2016-0089?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Gale, Douglas, 1987. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-54, October.
    3. Donna, Javier D. & Schenone, Pablo & Veramendi, Gregory F., 2020. "Networks, frictions, and price dispersion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 406-431.
    4. Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2004. "Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-77, March.
    5. Liran Einav & Theresa Kuchler & Jonathan Levin & Neel Sundaresan, 2015. "Assessing Sale Strategies in Online Markets Using Matched Listings," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 215-247, May.
    6. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-1150, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Talamàs, Eduard, 2019. "Price dispersion in stationary networked markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 247-264.
    2. Charness, Gary & Corominas-Bosch, Margarida & Frechette, Guillaume R., 2007. "Bargaining and network structure: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 28-65, September.
    3. Agranov, M. & Elliott, M., 2017. "Commitment and (In)Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1743, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Elif Özcan-Tok, 2020. "Bargaining on supply chain networks with heterogeneous valuations," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 28(2), pages 506-525, July.
    5. Thành Nguyen, 2015. "Coalitional Bargaining in Networks," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 63(3), pages 501-511, June.
    6. Gauer, F. & Hellmann, T., 2017. "Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 51-74.
    7. Bayati, Mohsen & Borgs, Christian & Chayes, Jennifer & Kanoria, Yash & Montanari, Andrea, 2015. "Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 417-454.
    8. Elliott, Matt & Nava, Francesco, 2019. "Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87219, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1994. "Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-298, September.
    10. Abreu, Dilip & Manea, Mihai, 2012. "Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 1-16.
    11. Cho, In-Koo & Matsui, Akihiko, 2013. "Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1659-1688.
    12. Gale, Douglas & Sabourian, Hamid, 2006. "Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 336-352, February.
    13. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225, Elsevier.
    14. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    15. Elliott, M. & Talamàs, E., 2020. "Bargaining Foundations for Price Taking in Matching Markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2070, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    16. Darpö, Erik & Domínguez, Alvaro & Martín-Rodríguez, María, 2023. "Formation of Networks in a Context with Diversity," AGI Working Paper Series 2023-02, Asian Growth Research Institute.
    17. Dilmé, Francesc, 2023. "Bargaining in small dynamic markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    18. John Wooders, 1997. "Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(1), pages 75-89.
    19. Kalyan Chatterjee & Kaustav Das, 2015. "Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the “law of one price”," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 949-991, November.
    20. Arnold Polanski & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2013. "Markets, Bargaining, and Networks with Heterogeneous Agents," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 038, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; frictions; networks; markets; arbitrage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:1:p:11:n:7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.