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Deconstructing The Labour Supply Curve

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  • David A. Spencer

Abstract

The nature and determinants of the supply of labour are re‐examined. Standard theories of labour supply, it is argued, have neglected to consider the affects of the quality of work activities on the motivation and welfare of workers. Work has tended to be seen as a means to an end rather than an end in itself and most attention has been given to the manipulation of wage incentives in affecting labour supply, to the neglect of changes in the work environment. The original contributions of W. Stanley Jevons and Alfred Marshall, in contrast, are shown to offer a fuller account of the work decision.

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  • David A. Spencer, 2004. "Deconstructing The Labour Supply Curve," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 442-458, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:metroe:v:55:y:2004:i:4:p:442-458
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2004.00202.x
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    Cited by:

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    3. Ignacio Falgueras‐Sorauren, 2010. "New Lights On The Robbinsian Theory Of Work Supply," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(4), pages 375-403, September.
    4. Ioannidis, Yiorgos, 2011. "Employment in the Keynesian and neoliberal universe: theoretical transformations and political correlations," MPRA Paper 45062, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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