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On the Choice of Risk and Effort in Tournaments—Experimental Evidence

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  • Petra Nieken

Abstract

We investigate a simple two‐person tournament in a controlled laboratory experiment. Each player chooses between two distributions of random shocks. After observing the overall risk, both players decide simultaneously on their effort. Theory predicts both players should choose the distribution with the higher variance of random shock, as this minimizes equilibrium effort. We show that the effort exerted is sensitive towards risk. The agents exert less effort if the random shock is high. However, agents do not learn to commit themselves by choosing a high risk in our experiment.

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  • Petra Nieken, 2010. "On the Choice of Risk and Effort in Tournaments—Experimental Evidence," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 811-840, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:3:p:811-840
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00270.x
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    2. Mueller-Langer Frank & Andreoli-Versbach Patrick, 2017. "Leading-Effect, Risk-Taking and Sabotage in Two-Stage Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 237(1), pages 1-28, February.
    3. Eriksen, Kristoffer W & Kvaløy, Ola, 2015. "2015/01 No guts, no glory: An experiment on excessive risk-taking by Kristoffer W. Eriksen and Ola Kvaløy," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2015/1, University of Stavanger.
    4. Eriksen, Kristoffer W. & Kvaløy, Ola, 2014. "Myopic risk-taking in tournaments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 37-46.
    5. Hammond, Robert G. & Zheng, Xiaoyong, 2013. "Heterogeneity in tournaments with incomplete information: An experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 248-260.
    6. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    7. Andersson, Ola & Holm, Håkan J. & Wengström, Erik, 2016. "Grind or Gamble? An Experimental Analysis of Effort and Spread Seeking in Contests," Working Papers 2016:37, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 28 Jan 2019.
    8. Kräkel, Matthias & Nieken, Petra & Przemeck, Judith, 2014. "Risk taking and investing in electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 98-120.
    9. Alexandru Manole & Madalina Anghel & Emilia Stanciu & Alexandru Badiu, 2016. "Analysis models for the financial risk," Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, vol. 64(9), pages 73-80, September.
    10. Buzzacchi, Luigi & Scellato, Giuseppe & Ughetto, Elisa, 2015. "Investment stage drifts and venture capital managerial incentives," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 118-128.
    11. Sheremeta, Roman M. & Wu, Steven Y., 2012. "Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure," IZA Discussion Papers 6304, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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    13. Fang, Dawei & Holmén, Martin & Kleinlercher, Daniel & Kirchler, Michael, 2017. "How tournament incentives affect asset markets: A comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 1-27.
    14. Philip Brookins & Jennifer Brown & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2016. "Peer Information and Risk-taking under Competitive and Non-competitive Pay Schemes," NBER Working Papers 22486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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