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Fiscal Rules And Government Borrowing Costs: International Evidence

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  • John Thornton
  • Chrysovalantis Vasilakis

Abstract

We find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985–2010. We apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self‐selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets. The results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology, and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the “risk premium” on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility. (JEL E43, G12, H60)

Suggested Citation

  • John Thornton & Chrysovalantis Vasilakis, 2018. "Fiscal Rules And Government Borrowing Costs: International Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 446-459, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:56:y:2018:i:1:p:446-459
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12484
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    Cited by:

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    2. Ablam Estel Apeti & Bao-We-Wal Bambe & Aguima Aime Bernard Lompo, 2023. "Determinants of public sector efficiency: a panel database from a stochastic frontier analysis," Post-Print hal-04189811, HAL.
    3. Slawomir Franek & Marta Postula, 2020. "Does Eurozone Membership Strengthen the Significance of Fiscal Instruments?," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 21(1), pages 131-151, May.
    4. Ablam Estel APETI & Bao-We-Wal BAMBE & Jean Louis COMBES, 2022. "On the Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Reforms : Fiscal Rules and Public Expenditure Efficiency," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2985, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    5. Ryota Nakatani, 2019. "A Possible Approach to Fiscal Rules in Small Islands — Incorporating Natural Disasters and Climate Change," IMF Working Papers 2019/186, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Cezara Vinturis, 2023. "How do fiscal rules shape governments' spending behavior?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(2), pages 322-341, April.
    7. Thornton, John & Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis, 2019. "Negative policy interest rates and exchange rate behavior: Further results," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 61-67.
    8. Cezara Vinturis, 2019. "A multi-speed fiscal Europe? Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Performance in the EU Former Communist Countries," Working Papers hal-03097483, HAL.
    9. López-Herrera, Carmen & Cordero, José M. & Pedraja-Chaparro, Francisco & Polo, Cristina, 2023. "Fiscal rules and their influence on public sector efficiency," MPRA Paper 119018, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Niklas Potrafke, 2023. "The Economic Consequences of Fiscal Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series 10765, CESifo.
    11. Dridi, Ichrak & Boughrara, Adel, 2021. "On the effect of full-fledged IT adoption on stock returns and their conditional volatility: Evidence from propensity score matching," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 179-194.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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