This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics John Driffill
Zeno Rotondi
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
No abstract is available for
this item.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review .
Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 1361-1366
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML ,
plain text ,
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:4:p:1361-1366Contact details of provider: Email: Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Bennett T. McCallum, 1995.
"Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence ,"
NBER Working Papers
5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: McCallum, Bennett T., 1997.
"Crucial issues concerning central bank independence ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Svensson, Lars E O, 1997.
"Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Svensson, L.E.O., 1995.
"Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts ,"
Papers
595, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
Lars E.O. Svensson, 1997.
"Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts ,"
NBER Working Papers
5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Svensson, Lars E O, 1995.
"Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Jensen, Henrik, 1997.
"Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 911-20, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? There are over 18000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service .
This page was last updated on 2009-1-7.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .