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An Experimental Study of a Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationship
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Cited by:
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000.
"Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers 040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series 336, CESifo.
- Königstein, Manfred & Ruchala, Gabriele K., 2007. "Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 2697, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2004.
"Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 453-474, October.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model," IEW - Working Papers 191, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model," Discussion Papers in Economics 335, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model," Munich Reprints in Economics 20657, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Schmidt, Klaus & Fehr, Ernst, 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 4464, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated".
"Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?,"
IEW - Working Papers
034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Gächter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3017, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2006.
"Competition, hidden information, and efficiency : an experiment,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
we071909, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2006. "Competition, Hidden information, and Efficiency: an Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00142849, HAL.
- Charness, Gary B & Cabrales, Antonio & VILLEVAL, MARIE-CLAIRE, 2007. "Competition, Hidden Information, And Efficiency: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3kp5v19m, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00175051, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment," Working Papers 0605, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2296, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rulliere & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2000.
"Free-Riding and Fairness in Principal - Multi-agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence,"
Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques
bla00048, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00151509, HAL.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00151509, HAL.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2000. "Free-Riding and Fairness in Principal -Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-03718476, HAL.
- Gary J. Miller & Andrew B. Whitford, 2002. "Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent Negotiations," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 231-267, April.
- Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006.
"Promises and Partnership,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
- Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "Promises and Partnership," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Wright, Peter & Mukherji, Ananda & Kroll, Mark J., 2001. "A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: extensions and extrapolations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 413-429.
- Keser, Claudia & Willinger, Marc, 2007.
"Theories of behavior in principal-agent relationships with hidden action,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(6), pages 1514-1533, August.
- Claudia Keser & Marc Willinger, 2002. "Theories Of Behavior In Principal-Agent Relationships With Hidden Action," Working Papers of BETA 2002-07, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Claudia Keser & Marc Willinger, 2007. "Theories of behavior in principal-agent relationships with hidden action [Théories du comportement dans une relation principal-agent, avec action dissimulée]," Post-Print hal-02662664, HAL.
- Angelova, Vera & Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2012.
"Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 48-58.
- Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher & Vera Popova, 2010. "Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents," Jena Economics Research Papers 2010-016, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G. & Popova, Vera, 2012. "Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents," Munich Reprints in Economics 18169, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary, 2011.
"Optimal contracts with team production and hidden information: An experiment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 163-176, February.
- Charness, Gary B & Cabrales, Antonio, 2008. "Optimal Contracts With Team Production And Hidden Information: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3bb3p3t3, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary, 2008. "“Optimal Contracts with Team Production and Hidden Information: An Experiment”," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt29v1b0pg, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Sebastian Galiani & Cheryl Long & Camila Navajas Ahumada & Gustavo Torrens, 2019.
"Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence,"
Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 239-269, May.
- Sebastian Galiani & Cheryl Long & Camila Navajas & Gustavo Torrens, 2016. "Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence," NBER Working Papers 21857, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2000. "Free-Riding and Fairness in Principal -Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03718476, HAL.
- Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M Schmidt, 2007.
"Fairness and Contract Design,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 121-154, January.
- Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "Fairness and Contract Design," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 67, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2007. "Fairness and contract design," Munich Reprints in Economics 20618, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, 2004.
"Contracts, Fairness and Incentives,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000148, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics 334, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M Schmidt, 2005. "Contracts, Fairness and Incentives," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000626, www.najecon.org.
- Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus Schmidt, 2004. "Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 1215, CESifo.
- Roman Fiala & Martin Prokop & Iva Živělová, 2012. "The relationship between inter-organizational trust and performance," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 89-98.
- Simon Gächter & Armin Falk, 2002.
"Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(1), pages 1-26, March.
- Simon Gaechter & Armin Falk, "undated". "Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation," IEW - Working Papers 019, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Gächter, Simon & Falk, Armin, 2001. "Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for Labour Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3018, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Werner G³th & Manfred K÷nigstein & NadÞge Marchand & Klaus Nehring, 2001.
"Trust and Reciprocity in the Investment Game with Indirect Reward,"
Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 241-262.
- Güth, Werner & Königstein, Manfred & Marchand, Nadège & Nehring, Klaus, 2000. "Trust and reciprocity in the investment game with indirect reward," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,110, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2005. "How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage," IZA Discussion Papers 1777, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Prasad, Kislaya & Salmon, Timothy C., 2013. "Self Selection and market power in risk sharing contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 71-86.
- van Wijk, R.A.J.L. & van den Bosch, F.A.J. & Volberda, H.W. & Heinhuis, S.M., 2005. "Reciprocity of Knowledge Flows in Internal Network Forms of Organizing," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-024-STR, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
- Vital Anderhub & Simon Gächter & Manfred Königstein, 2002.
"Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 5-27, June.
- Vital Anderhub & Simon Gaechter & Manfred Koenigstein, "undated". "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 018, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Anderhub, Vital & Gächter, Simon & Königstein, Manfred, 1999. "Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,82, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Simon Gaechter & Armin Falk, 2001. "Reputation or Reciprocity? An Experimental Investigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 496, CESifo.
- Ranjay Gulati & Maxim Sytch, 2008. "Does familiarity breed trust? Revisiting the antecedents of trust," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2-3), pages 165-190.
- Roman Fiala & Martin Prokop, 2013. "The relationship among reputation, inter-organizational trust and alliance performance," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 899-908.
- Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003.
"Promises & Partnership,"
Research Papers in Economics
2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Charness, Gary B & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2006. "Promises & Partnership," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0127h86v, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2000. "Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment," Economics Working Papers 478, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2008. "How many winners are good to have?: On tournaments with sabotage," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 682-702, March.
- Lory Barile, 2012. "Does tax evasion affect firms’ internal control? Some evidence from an experimental approach," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 039, University of Siena.