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Permit Trading and Stability of International Climate Agreements

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Hans-Peter Weikard & Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, 2006. "The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 209-232, April.
  2. Lessmann, Kai & Kornek, Ulrike & Dellink, Rob & Emmerling, Johannes & Eyckmans, Johan & Nagashima, Miyuki & Weikard, Hans-Peter & Yang, Zili, 2014. "The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Integrated Assessment Models," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 163598, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  3. Francesco Furini & Francesco Bosello, 2021. "Accounting for adaptation and its effectiveness in International Environmental Agreements," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 23(2), pages 467-493, April.
  4. Thomas Norman & Heinrich H. Nax, 2011. "Leading the Way: Coalitional Stability in Technological Cooperation & Sequential Climate Policy," Economics Series Working Papers 585, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & De Cian, Enrica & Duval, Romain & Massetti, Emanuele & Tavoni, Massimo, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model," Sustainable Development Papers 54281, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  6. Sferra, Fabio & Tavoni, Massimo, 2013. "Endogenous Participation in a Partial Climate Agreement with Open Entry: A Numerical Assessment," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 156486, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  7. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 379-396, December.
  8. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0414, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  9. Mark Schopf, 2024. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Altruistic Preferences," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 87(9), pages 2309-2359, September.
  10. Dritan Osmani, "undated". "A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint maximization assumption," Working Papers FNU-176, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University.
  11. le Roux, Sara, 2020. "Climate change catastrophes and insuring decisions: A study in the presence of ambiguity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 992-1002.
  12. Juan‐Carlos Altamirano‐Cabrera & Michael Finus & Rob Dellink, 2008. "Do Abatement Quotas Lead To More Successful Climate Coalitions?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 76(1), pages 104-129, January.
  13. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 702, OECD Publishing.
  14. Carlo Carraro & Emanuele Massetti, 2010. "International Climate Change Negotiations: Lessons from Theory," Chapters, in: Emilio Cerdá Tena & Xavier Labandeira (ed.), Climate Change Policies, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  15. Nagashima, Miyuki & Dellink, Rob & van Ierland, Ekko & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2009. "Stability of international climate coalitions -- A comparison of transfer schemes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 1476-1487, March.
  16. Hans-Peter Weikard & Rob Dellink, 2014. "Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 220(1), pages 49-68, September.
  17. Håkon Sælen, 2016. "Side-payments: an effective instrument for building climate clubs?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(6), pages 909-932, December.
  18. Kai Lessmann & Ulrike Kornek & Valentina Bosetti & Rob Dellink & Johannes Emmerling & Johan Eyckmans & Miyuki Nagashima & Hans-Peter Weikard & Zili Yang, 2015. "The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 811-836, December.
  19. Eren Cifci & Matthew E. Oliver, 2018. "Reassessing the Links between GHG Emissions, Economic Growth, and the UNFCCC: A Difference-in-Differences Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-22, January.
  20. Carlo Carraro, 2014. "International environmental cooperation," Chapters, in: Giles Atkinson & Simon Dietz & Eric Neumayer & Matthew Agarwala (ed.), Handbook of Sustainable Development, chapter 26, pages 418-431, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  21. Baran Doda, Simon Quemin, Luca Taschini, 2017. "A theory of gains from trade in multilaterally linked ETSs," GRI Working Papers 275, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
  22. S. Yu & H.-P. Weikard & X. Zhu & E. C. Ierland, 2017. "International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: Results from the STACO model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 255(1), pages 95-116, August.
  23. S. Yu & E. C. Ierland & H.-P. Weikard & X. Zhu, 2017. "Nash bargaining solutions for international climate agreements under different sets of bargaining weights," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 709-729, October.
  24. Kai Lessmann & Robert Marschinski & Michael Finus & Ulrike Kornek & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2014. "Emissions Trading with Non-signatories in a Climate Agreement—an Analysis of Coalition Stability," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82, pages 82-109, December.
  25. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2009. "Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 389-406, March.
  26. Hans-Peter Weikard & Rob Dellink & Ekko Ierland, 2010. "Renegotiations in the Greenhouse," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(4), pages 573-596, April.
  27. Astrid Dannenberg & Bodo Sturm & Carsten Vogt, 2010. "Do Equity Preferences Matter for Climate Negotiators? An Experimental Investigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(1), pages 91-109, September.
  28. Peter Egger & Christoph Jeßberger & Mario Larch, 2011. "Trade and investment liberalization as determinants of multilateral environmental agreement membership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(6), pages 605-633, December.
  29. Ulrike Kornek & Jan Christoph Steckel & Kai Lessmann & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2017. "The climate rent curse: new challenges for burden sharing," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(6), pages 855-882, December.
  30. Matthew McGinty, 2020. "Leadership and Free-Riding: Decomposing and Explaining the Paradox of Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(2), pages 449-474, October.
  31. M Sáiz & Eligius Hendrix & Niels Olieman, 2006. "On the Computation of Stability in Multiple Coalition Formation Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 251-275, October.
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