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Trigger Price Regulation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wirl, Franz, 2010. "Dynamic demand and noncompetitive intertemporal output adjustments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 220-229, May.
  2. Wallner, Klaus, 2002. "Implicit contracts between regulator and industry: protection and deregulation in Japanese casualty insurance," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 379-400, December.
  3. Franz Wirl, 2009. "Intertemporal monopolistic pricing of non-durables," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 97-119, June.
  4. Moretto Michele & Valbonesi Paola, 2007. "Firm Regulation and Profit Sharing: A Real Option Approach," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-34, November.
  5. Breitscheidel, Jörg, 2005. "Hold-up Problems with Respect to R&D Investment and Licensing in Environmental Regulation," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-86, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  6. Yossef Spiegel & Simon Wilkie, 1996. "Investment in a New Technology as a Signal of Firm Value Under Regulatory Opportunism," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 251-276, June.
  7. David J. Salant & Glenn A. Woroch, 1991. "Crossing Dupuit'S Bridge Again: A Trigger Policy For Efficient Investment In Infrastructure," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(1), pages 101-114, January.
  8. Silaghi, Florina & Sarkar, Sudipto, 2021. "Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(3), pages 1174-1191.
  9. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2009-006 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Strausz, Roland, 2009. "Regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2009-006, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
  11. Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008. "Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January.
  12. Gersbach, Hans & Glazer, Amihai, 1999. "Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 151-164, March.
  13. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
  14. Joerg Breitscheidel & Hans Gersbach, 2005. "Self-Financing Environmental Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 1528, CESifo.
  15. De Meio Reggiani, Martin C. & Vazquez, Miguel & Hallack, Michelle & Brignole, Nélida B., 2019. "The role of governmental commitment on regulated utilities," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  16. Olga Chiappinelli & Karsten Neuhoff, 2017. "Time-Consistent Carbon Pricing," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1710, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  17. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18946 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Mercadier, Augusto C. & Brenner, Federica S., 2020. "Tariff (un)sustainability in contexts of price (in)stability: The case of the Buenos Aires water and sanitation concession," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  19. Estache, Antonio & Martimort, David, 1999. "Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2073, The World Bank.
  20. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
  21. Carlos Pérez Montes, 2011. "Optimal capital structure and Regulatory Control," Working Papers 1128, Banco de España.
  22. Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2013. "Commitment in utility regulation: A model of reputation and policy applications," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 210-231.
  23. Guthrie, Graeme, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Working Paper Series 18946, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  24. Galetovic, Alexander & Hogan, William W., 2008. "Comments," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123320, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  25. Levine, Paul & Rickman, Neil, 2002. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3200, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Guthrie, Graeme, 2012. "Regulated prices and real options," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 650-663.
  27. Spiegel, Yossef, 1997. "The choice of technology and capital structure under rate regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 191-216, April.
  28. Chiappinelli, Olga & May, Nils, 2022. "Too good to be true? Time-inconsistent renewable energy policies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
  29. Guthrie, Graeme, 2020. "Regulation, welfare, and the risk of asset stranding," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 273-287.
  30. Breitscheidel, Jörg, 2005. "Self-financing Tax/Subsidy Mechanisms in Environmental Regulation with Many Firms," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-87, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  31. Nils May & Olga Chiappinelli, 2018. "Too Good to Be True? How Time-Inconsistent Renewable Energy Policies Can Deter Investments," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1726, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  32. Sarkar, Sudipto, 2015. "Price limits and corporate investment: The consumers' perspective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 168-178.
  33. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
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