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Optimal Executive Compensation when Firm Size Follows Geometric Brownian Motion

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Giat, Yahel & Subramanian, Ajay, 2013. "Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2833-2861.
  2. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2011. "Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2356-2388.
  3. Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2016. "Robust Contracts in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1405-1440, July.
  4. Thibaut Mastrolia & Dylan Possamai, 2015. "Moral hazard under ambiguity," Papers 1511.03616, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2016.
  5. Zhiguo He & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu & Feng Gao, 2017. "Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(6), pages 2006-2065.
  6. Qi Zeng & Hae Won (Henny) Jung, 2014. "Optimal Contract, Ownership Structure and Asset Pricing," 2014 Meeting Papers 911, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Gabaix, Xavier & Sannikov, Yuliy & Edmans, Alex & Sadzik, Tomasz, 2009. "Dynamic Incentive Accounts," CEPR Discussion Papers 7497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2620-2647.
  10. Tak-Yuen Wong, 2019. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4032-4048, September.
  11. Jean-Paul Décamps & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2019. "A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-28, January.
  12. Kelly Shue & Richard Townsend, 2016. "Growth through Rigidity: An Explanation for the Rise in CEO Pay," NBER Working Papers 21975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Leonardo Becchetti & Nazaria Solferino & Maria Elisabetta Tessitore, 2016. "Corporate social responsibility and profit volatility: theory and empirical evidence," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 25(1), pages 49-89.
  14. Rui Li & Mengying Wang, 2020. "Moral Hazard, Agency Cost, and Firm Growth," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 20(3), pages 639-664, September.
  15. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
  16. Cui, Zhenyu & Lars Kirkby, J. & Nguyen, Duy, 2019. "A general framework for time-changed Markov processes and applications," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 273(2), pages 785-800.
  17. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  18. Shan, Yaping, 2019. "Incentives for research agents and performance-vested equity-based compensation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 44-69.
  19. Vasama, Suvi, 2016. "Dynamic contracting with long-term consequences: Optimal CEO compensation and turnover," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2016-044, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
  20. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2lk3hracjf8vip44o7neiujmv7 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Chang-Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2017. "The impact of firm size on dynamic incentives and investment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 147-177, March.
  22. Rui Li & Dana Kiku & Hengjie Ai, 2014. "A Mechanism Design Model of Firm Dynamics: The Case of Limited Commitment," 2014 Meeting Papers 855, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  23. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2017_014 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Sylvain Chassang, 2013. "Calibrated Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(5), pages 1935-1971, September.
  25. Vasama, Suvi, 2017. "Contracting with long-term consequences," Research Discussion Papers 14/2017, Bank of Finland.
  26. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2020. "Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
  27. Qian Qi, 2023. "Artificial Intelligence and Dual Contract," Papers 2303.12350, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
  28. Strebulaev, Ilya A. & Whited, Toni M., 2012. "Dynamic Models and Structural Estimation in Corporate Finance," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 6(1–2), pages 1-163, November.
  29. Chong Lai & Rui Li & Yonghong Wu, 2020. "Optimal compensation and investment affected by firm size and time-varying external factors," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 407-422, September.
  30. Szydlowski, Martin & Yoon, Ji Hee, 2022. "Ambiguity in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
  31. Theodoros M. Diasakos, 2011. "A Simple Characterization of Dynamic Completeness in Continuous Time," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 211, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  32. Diasakos, Theodoros M, 2013. "Comparative Statics of Asset Prices: the effect of other assets' risk," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-94, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  33. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley, 2023. "CEO Compensation: Facts," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 50, pages 6-27, October.
  34. Dylan Possamai & Nizar Touzi, 2020. "Is there a Golden Parachute in Sannikov's principal-agent problem?," Papers 2007.05529, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
  35. Szydlowski, Martin, 2019. "Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  36. Ai, Hengjie & Li, Rui, 2015. "Investment and CEO compensation under limited commitment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 452-472.
  37. Wang, Ying & Huang, Wenli & Liu, Bo & Zhang, Xiaohong, 2020. "Optimal effort in the principal-agent problem with time-inconsistent preferences," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
  38. Vasama, Suvi, 2017. "Contracting with long-term consequences," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 14/2017, Bank of Finland.
  39. Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A. & Werquin, N., 2016. "Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 725-841, Elsevier.
  40. He, Zhiguo, 2011. "A model of dynamic compensation and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 351-366, May.
  41. Piskorski, Tomasz & Westerfield, Mark M., 2016. "Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 242-281.
  42. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2023. "Termination as an incentive device," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
  43. Hengjie Ai & Kai Li & Rui Li, 2024. "Moral Hazard and Investment-Cash-Flow Sensitivity," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 25(1), pages 143-174, May.
  44. Nengjiu Ju & Xuhu Wan, 2012. "Optimal Compensation and Pay-Performance Sensitivity in a Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(3), pages 641-657, March.
  45. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
  46. Wojakowski, Rafal M. & Ebrahim, M. Shahid & Shackleton, Mark B., 2016. "Reducing the impact of real estate foreclosures with Amortizing Participation Mortgages," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 62-74.
  47. Morellec, Erwan & Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon, 2018. "Agency Conflicts over the Short and Long Run: Short-termism, Long-termism, and Pay-for-Luck," CEPR Discussion Papers 12720, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  48. Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon & Morellec, Erwan, 2020. "Agency conflicts and short- versus long-termism in corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 718-742.
  49. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2009. "Borrowing Constraint as an Optimal Contract," MPRA Paper 23216, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  50. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-044 is not listed on IDEAS
  51. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2lk3hracjf8vip44o7neiujmv7 is not listed on IDEAS
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