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Optimal Contracts with Shirking

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2016. "Optimal Contracts with Reflection," Working Paper 16-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  2. Stephen Terry & Anastasia Zakolyukina & Toni Whited, 2018. "Information Distortion, R&D, and Growth," 2018 Meeting Papers 217, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2016. "Robust Contracts in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1405-1440, July.
  4. Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Westerfield, Mark M., 2021. "Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 560-581.
  5. Peter G. Hansen, 2021. "New Formulations of Ambiguous Volatility with an Application to Optimal Dynamic Contracting," Papers 2101.12306, arXiv.org.
  6. Okat, Deniz & Nash, John G.F., 2024. "Delegating trial and error," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
  7. Tak-Yuen Wong, 2019. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4032-4048, September.
  8. Jean-Paul Décamps & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2019. "A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-28, January.
  9. Rui Li & Mengying Wang, 2020. "Moral Hazard, Agency Cost, and Firm Growth," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 20(3), pages 639-664, September.
  10. Alexis Anagnostakis, 2023. "Pricing and hedging for a sticky diffusion," Papers 2311.17011, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
  11. Stephen J. Terry & Toni M. Whited & Anastasia A. Zakolyukina, 2020. "Information versus Investment," Working Papers 2020-110, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  12. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  13. Peng Sun & Feng Tian, 2018. "Optimal Contract to Induce Continued Effort," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(9), pages 4193-4217, September.
  14. Rui Li & Dana Kiku & Hengjie Ai, 2014. "A Mechanism Design Model of Firm Dynamics: The Case of Limited Commitment," 2014 Meeting Papers 855, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  15. Mahmoud Sami Nabi, 2016. "Revisiting equity and debt: access to finance and economic inefficiency," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(4), pages 393-429, December.
  16. Qian Qi, 2023. "Artificial Intelligence and Dual Contract," Papers 2303.12350, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
  17. Felix Feng, 2018. "Dynamic Compensation under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  18. Yu Huang & Nengjiu Ju & Hao Xing, 2023. "Performance Evaluation, Managerial Hedging, and Contract Termination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4953-4971, August.
  19. Szydlowski, Martin, 2019. "Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
  20. Ai, Hengjie & Li, Rui, 2015. "Investment and CEO compensation under limited commitment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 452-472.
  21. Hansen, Peter G., 2022. "New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
  22. Fong, Yuk-fai & Li, Jin, 2017. "Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 270-293.
  23. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Rulebooks in Relational Contracts," Working Papers 2019-7, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
  24. Piskorski, Tomasz & Westerfield, Mark M., 2016. "Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 242-281.
  25. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2023. "Termination as an incentive device," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
  26. repec:oup:rfinst:v:21:y:2017:i:5:p:1805-1846. is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Hengjie Ai & Kai Li & Rui Li, 2024. "Moral Hazard and Investment-Cash-Flow Sensitivity," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 25(1), pages 143-174, May.
  28. Li, Rui, 2017. "Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 74-91.
  29. Rui Li, 2018. "Could Risk Management Be Harmful to Firms?," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 247-263, May.
  30. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
  31. Feng Tian & Peng Sun & Izak Duenyas, 2021. "Optimal Contract for Machine Repair and Maintenance," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 916-949, May.
  32. Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee & Luis Vasconcelos, 2023. "What Makes Agility Fragile? A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Rigidity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3578-3601, June.
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