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Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Joonmo Cho & Iljoong Kim, 2001. "Jobs in the Bureaucratic Afterlife: A Corruption‐Facilitating Mechanism Associated with Law Enforcement," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(2), pages 330-348, October.
  2. Keefer, Philip, 2001. "When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2543, The World Bank.
  3. Dal Bo, E., 2000. "Bribing Voters," Economics Series Working Papers 9939, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Jin-Li Hu & Chung-Huang Huang & Wei-Kai Chu, 2004. "Bribery, hierarchical government, and incomplete environmental enforcement," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 6(3), pages 177-196, September.
  5. J. Vernon Henderson & Ari Kuncoro, 2006. "Sick of Local Government Corruption? Vote Islamic," NBER Working Papers 12110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Muthukumara Mani, 2004. "The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 363-390, February.
  7. Cooter Robert D. & Garoupa Nuno, 2014. "A Disruption Mechanism for Bribes," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 241-263, November.
  8. Henry Ergas, 2008. "Should Australia Encourage Developing Countries to Adopt Competition Laws?," Asia Pacific Economic Papers 376, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  9. Mat McCubbins & Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, 2005. "The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies," Discussion Papers 04-035, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  10. Friedel Bolle & Claudia Vogel, 2011. "Power comes with responsibility—or does it?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 459-470, September.
  11. Dal Bó, Ernesto & Dal Bó, Pedro & Di Tella, Rafael, 2006. "“Plata o Plomo?”: Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 41-53, February.
  12. Bardhan, Pranab & Yang, Tsung-Tao, 2004. "Political Competition in Economic Perspective," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt1907c39n, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  13. Yang, David Da-hua, 2005. "Corruption by monopoly: Bribery in Chinese enterprise licensing as a repeated bargaining game," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 171-188.
  14. Chen, Ying & Zápal, Jan, 2022. "Sequential vote buying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
  15. Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago, 2023. "Collective hold-up," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
  16. Matias Iaryczower & Santiago Oliveros, 2017. "Competing for Loyalty: The Dynamics of Rallying Support," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(10), pages 2990-3005, October.
  17. Louis-Sidois, Charles & Musolff, Leon Andreas, 2024. "Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
  18. Merz, Christian, 2004. "Corruption in an Unstable Environment," Discussion Papers in Economics 367, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  19. repec:esx:essedp:768 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Cooter, Robert & Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt83c0k3wc, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  21. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 221-241, July.
  22. Wolfgang Maennig, 2004. "Korruption im internationalen Sport: ökonomische Analyse und Lösungsansätze," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 263-291.
  23. J. Vernon Henderson & Ari Kuncoro, 2004. "Corruption in Indonesia," NBER Working Papers 10674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Wolfgang Maennig, 2002. "On the Economics of Doping and Corruption in International Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(1), pages 61-89, February.
  25. Pyne, Derek, 2006. "Microfoundations of Influencing Public Opinion: Lobbying and Voting for Trade Policies," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 21, pages 551-576.
  26. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
  27. Aladwani, Adel M., 2016. "Corruption as a source of e-Government projects failure in developing countries: A theoretical exposition," International Journal of Information Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 105-112.
  28. Shyh-Fang Ueng, 1999. "The Virtue of Installing Veto Players," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 265-282, October.
  29. Yan-Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2021. "What Determines the Return to Bribery? Evidence from Corruption Cases Worldwide," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(10), pages 6235-6265, October.
  30. Henry Ergas, 2008. "Should Australia Encourage Developing Countries to Adopt Competition Laws?," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22307, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
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