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Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests

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  1. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
  2. John P. Lightle, 2014. "The Paternalistic Bias of Expert Advice," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(4), pages 876-898, December.
  3. Ma, Chenghu, 2000. "Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 451-482, March.
  4. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
  5. Brenton Kenkel, 2019. "The efficacy of cheap talk in collective action problems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 370-402, July.
  6. Chen, Ying, 2012. "Value of public information in sender–receiver games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 343-345.
  7. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2006. "Professional advice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 120-142, January.
  8. Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & D'Agostino, Elena & Pavesi, Filippo, 2023. "Watch your words: An experimental study on communication and the opportunity cost of delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 216-232.
  9. Suvorov Anton & Tsybuleva Natalia, 2010. "Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-35, November.
  10. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2015.
  11. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
  13. Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1991. "Refining cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 247-273, December.
  14. Amir Habibi, 2023. "Communicating Preferences to Improve Recommendations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 394, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  15. Oded Berman & Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi & Dmitry Krass, 2019. "Truthful Cheap Talk: Why Operational Flexibility May Lead to Truthful Communication," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1624-1641, April.
  16. Chao, Hong & Ho, Chun-Yu & Huang, Shaoqing & Qin, Xiangdong & Cong, Jiajia, 2019. "Partners or rivals? An experimental study of a two-stage tournament," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 288-310.
  17. Navin Kartik & SangMok Lee & Daniel Rappoport, 2022. "Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments," Papers 2212.12009, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
  18. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sorensen, 2002. "Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 02-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  19. Pedro M. Gardete & Yakov Bart, 2018. "Tailored Cheap Talk: The Effects of Privacy Policy on Ad Content and Market Outcomes," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(5), pages 733-752, September.
  20. Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1203, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  21. Jeahan Jung & Jeong Yoo Kim, 2024. "Cheap Talk with Transparent and Monotone Motives from a Seller to an Informed Buyer," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-20, May.
  22. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2018. "The strategist and the tactician," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 427-434.
  24. Murali Agastya & Parimal Kanti Bag & Indranil Chakraborty, 2014. "Communication and authority with a partially informed expert," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 176-197, March.
  25. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
  26. Garfagnini, Umberto & Ottaviani, Marco & Sørensen, Peter Norman, 2014. "Accept or reject? An organizational perspective," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 66-74.
  27. Alfred Wagenhofer, 2000. "Disclosure of proprietary information in the course of an acquisition," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(1), pages 57-69.
  28. Chung, Jeahan & Kim, Jeong-Yoo, 2018. "Cheap talk by multiple speakers in the presence of network externalities," Economics Discussion Papers 2018-9, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  29. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," SciencePo Working papers hal-00973071, HAL.
  31. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2019. "Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 303-334, September.
  32. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00973071, HAL.
  33. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1992. "On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 992, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  34. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information," Discussion Papers 13-01r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  35. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer.
  36. Jeahan Jung & Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2019. "Cheap Talk by Two Senders in the Presence of Network Externalities," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 249-274.
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