Report NEP-POL-2005-10-15

This is the archive for NEP-POL, a report on new working papers in the area of Positive Political Economics. Eugene Beaulieu issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-POL

The following items were announced in this report:

• Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 2004. "Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
• Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why do Politicians Delegate?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000470, UCLA Department of Economics.
• Item repec:eab:govern:638 is not listed on IDEAS anymore

• James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2005. "A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint," Working Paper Series 5605, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
• Silje Aslaksen & Ragnar Torvik, 2005. "A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states," Working Paper Series 5805, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.