Report NEP-GTH-2020-11-16

This is the archive for NEP-GTH, a report on new working papers in the area of Game Theory. Sylvain Béal issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-GTH

The following items were announced in this report:

• A. D. Correia & L. L. Leestmaker & H. T. C. Stoof, 2020. "Asymmetric games on networks: towards an Ising-model representation," Papers 2011.02739, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
• Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach, 2020. "Open Rule Legislative Bargaining," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 20/346, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
• Ron Berman & Yuval Heller, 2020. "Naive analytics equilibrium," Papers 2010.15810, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
• Alessandro Sontuoso & Sudeep Bhatia, 2020. "A Notion of Prominence for Games with Natural-Language Labels," Working Papers 20-38, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
• Manuel Staab, 2020. "Evolution of Risk-Taking Behaviour and Status Preferences in Anti-Coordination Games," Papers 2011.02740, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
• Masaaki Fujii, 2020. "Probabilistic Approach to Mean Field Games and Mean Field Type Control Problems with Multiple Populations," CARF F-Series CARF-F-497, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
• Strulik, Holger & Werner, Katharina, 2020. "Renewable resource use with imperfect self-control," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 408, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
• Montinaro, Marta & Pal, Rupayan & Scrimitore, Marcella, 2020. "Per Unit and Ad Valorem Royalties in a Patent Licensing Game," FACTS: Firms And Cities Towards Sustainability 307305, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) > FACTS: Firms And Cities Towards Sustainability.
• Renee Bowen & Ilwoo Hwang & Stefan Krasa, 2020. "Personal Power Dynamics in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 27981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Heursen, Lea & Ranehill, Eva & Weber, Roberto A, 2020. "Are women less effective leaders than men? Evidence from experiments using coordination games," Working Papers in Economics 796, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
• José Mª Alonso-Meijide & Mikel Álvarez-Mozos & Mª Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro & Andrés Jiménez-Losada, 2019. "A new order on embedded coalitions: Properties and applications," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2019/388, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
• Key, Peter & Steinberg, Richard, 2020. "Pricing, competition and content for internet service providers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 107008, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
• Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2020. "Managerial Leadership, Truth-Telling, and Efficient Coordination," Working Papers 1211, Barcelona School of Economics.
• Béatrice Boulu-Reshef & Nina Rapoport, 2020. "Voluntary contributions in cascades: The tragedy of ill-informed leadership," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02977853, HAL.
• Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020. "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-498, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Feb 2021.
• Wiens, Marcus & Mahdavian, Farnaz & Platt, Stephen & Schultmann, Frank, 2020. "Optimal evacuation-decisions facing the trade-off between early-warning precision, evacuation-cost and trust - the Warning Compliance Model (WCM)," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy 47, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP).
• Takahiko Kan, 2020. "Reinterpreting the General Rules of Morality and the Corruption of Moral Sentiments in The Theory of Moral Sentiments with an Evolutionary Game Model," TERG Discussion Papers 432, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
• Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & A. Malézieux & Jason F. Shogren, 2020. "Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-02576845, HAL.